A Tale of Two Reports
By Sumanasiri Liyanage
The expert committee that was appointed to assist the All Party Conference on how the constitution could be amended in order to address and redress the grievances of the numerically small communities has failed to generate a consensus in developing its proposals. So we have two committee reports, namely the Reports of Sub-Committee A and the Report of the Sub-Committee B (hereafter RSCA and RSCB). Although the two reports have been depicted as mutually exclusive, there are some overlapping and similarities. For example, the both sub-committees accept that Sri Lanka is a multi-ethnic, multi-religious and multi-cultural society in which numerically small communities have many true grievances and that those grievances should be addressed and steps taken to correct them. Both sub-committees also agree that the state restructuring is one the principal ways in which those grievances be addressed.. There has been also agreement that the state restructuring through constitutional change should include inter alia a setting up of at least two constitutionally separate competencies –namely two-tiers of governments. Both committees argue that these changes can in fact be extended to a third-tier of governance following the Indian Panchayat system. These agreements can be described as the gains of devolution discourse in the last two decades or so and of significant importance although the two committees took different directions in concretizing their proposals of state restructuring.
People who have read my early interventions in the constitutional debate would easily recognize that my personal views are much closer to the views and suggestions included in the RSCA. In my opinion, the main weakness of the RSCB is that its members have failed to produce a negotiable position. Like the ISGA (Interim Self-Governing Authority) proposal of the LTTE, RSCB proposal lies outside the negotiable range (see Figure 1). In Figure 1, while the ISGA proposal lies in Zone C, the RSCB is in Zone A. The most favorable solution from the perspective of Sinhala nationalism offers Thamils a negative value while the most favorable solution for Thamil nationalism would give Sinhalese a negative value. So the most important criterion in evaluating separate constitutional proposals in a divided society is to see if those proposals create a new space within which the different communities (nations as well as ethnic groups) in a pluri-national society could begin negotiations in order to arrive at either a consensual (best option) or a compromise (second-best option) solution. Here my focus is not the concrete recommendations of the RSCB such as (1) the existing province should be the unit of devolution and (2) the sub-government units should not be based on ethnic or linguistic grounds. The question I raise is: Is it possible to change the position in the RSCB to make it a negotiable position?
Why is this important? The fundamental concepts as outlined in Mahinda Chinthanaya are “an undivided country, national consensus, and an honorable peace” (p. 32). The Unitary nature of the state is in fact subordinated to these concepts. That is why he expressed his readiness to “abide by the majority consensus” although it is different from his own position (Mahinda Chintanaya, p. 33). Figure 1 shows that a majority of political actors subscribes to proposals that fall within Zone B. In a pluri-national society, the concept of majority means two things. First, it means the majority of the voters when each person is given one vote. Secondly, the majority means the majority of communities. As Nobel laureate economist Arthur Lewis suggested the first without the second is not only impractical but also immoral. The positive aspect of the RSCA is that its suggestions not only falls within the negotiable range of Zone B, but also those suggestions get the approval of all the representatives of numerically small nations in the expert committee. Moreover, it is interesting to note that Thamil diasporic writers also came forward in supporting the suggestions of the RSCA. (I particularly refer to two excellent articles by Dr S Narapalasingham in tamilweek.com on December 8 and Dec 23, 2006
[Click to see] Figure 1
Negotiable and Non-Negotiable Positions
NOTE: the Zone B is the negotiable zone while the Zone A and Zone C are non-negotiable zones.
In my view, the RSCB suffers from these flaws for two reasons. First, although the RSCB affirms that the Sri Lanka is “a multi-ethnic, multi-religious and multi-cultural” society and the numerically small communities in the island have many true grievances, it fails to accept the fact that the current Sri Lankan state does not reflect this pluri-national character of the society and at least some of those grievances stem directly from the structure of the state. In other words, its suggestion for devolution of power is not political but technical in the sense that the proposed devolution of power is not legitimized by the political imperatives but by the principal of subsidiarity. Of course, the principle of subsidiarity is a strong and justifiable argument for devolution of power. However, the principle of subsidiarity has to be linked with the issue of identity in a pluri-national society. It is not just making the decision-making bodies closer to people in an abstract sense but making them closer to people who are enmeshed in multiple cultural linkages. In other words, it means an ensuring the rights of self-determination of people. Had the members of the Sub-Committee B internalized their proposal in the political and power struggles of the country, they would have come up with a set of proposals that would fall within the negotiation range. Secondly, the members of the Sub-Committee B appear to assume that the LTTE would be a permanent and integral feature of Thamil politics. Of course, the actions of the fascistic LTTE are a matter of concerns not only for the Sinhalese and Muslims, but also for all democratically oriented persons. Such tendencies are not limited to Thamil politics only. We have witnessed many a time in our post-colonial history such tendencies in varying degree in the Sinhala polity. On the other hand, the Sinhala polity has not produced in recent times a politician like Ananda Sangaree who stands for democracy, justice and peace in a very difficult situation. My point is that constitution should include checks and balances and protections and safeguards that are democratically governed not ethnically driven. What the RSCB proposes is as Dr Narapalasingham mentioned “minimum devolution and maximum safeguards.”
I believe both the RSCA and RSCB can be improved if they revisit their recommendations from the perspective of cooperative governance. In this sense, I believe that the devolution perspective that dominates the Sri Lankan discourse should be replaced by power-sharing perspectives. The RSCB proposes a kind of super-ordinate governance in place of cooperative governance. Let me end this article by referring to one minor point. The RSCB suggests that the Northern and Eastern Province should be separated. However, the argument of the RSCB contradicts its own argument. It is against mono ethnic units and favors “muti-ethnic units” (p. 6). The Table it provides in support of de-merger shows the ethnic composition of the Eastern Province and the amalgamated North-East Province. The argument is in an amalgamated unit, the Sinhalese and Muslims would be reduced to a minority. This is not a strong argument for two reasons. There are no predominant reasons in normal situations to put the Sinhalese and Muslims together. Historically it was the Muslims and Thamils who co-operated more in political alliances. Secondly, the merged unit would definitely reduce Thamil majority in the non-merged Northern Province. The percentage of Thamils in the Northern Province is almost 95 per cent of its population even before the ethnic cleansing policies of the LTTE. In a merged unit, it is reduced to 65 per cent. So one may argue, if the Sub-Committee B is really interested in multi-ethnic units, they should favor North-East merger.
It is interesting to note that Sub-Committee B does not claim that its proposal represents the singular available option and is “mindful of the multitude of options that may be available in the search for suitable solution to the conflict” (RSCB, p. 5). So the Sub- Committee B affirms that its position is criticizable. So I believe a healthy and free discussion would finally generate a new space that allows negotiated solution to the current conflict.
[The writer teaches political economy at the University of Peradeniya].
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