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Statement on the peace process by Professor G. L. Peiris on behalf UNP

It is evident that the country is today in the throes of a grave crisis. At the core of this is the acute anxiety caused in the minds of the public by the virtual collapse of the peace process. This has brought about the most serious consequences in every aspect of the life of the nation.

The United National Party, as the largest political party in the Opposition, was convinced that a Government elected to office with a fresh mandate is entitled to the benefit of every opportunity to translate its mandate into concrete action. It is for this reason that our Party, with a due sense of responsibility, refrained during the last seven months from any course of action which could aggravate the problems of the Government in pursuing the goal of a just and durable peace.

At this time, however, the dangerously deteriorating security situation has demonstrated beyond any doubt that the Government’s approach to the peace process is fundamentally flawed.

We consider it our duty, therefore, in an objective and dispassionate spirit to point out to the Government and the public the infirmities and anomalies inherent in the Government’s approach to the pursuit of peace in our country. In doing so, we are strengthened by the belief that there is still an opportunity to redeem a dismal situation if only we have the courage and the wisdom to seize it.

We offer the following constructive suggestions in the hope that this opportunity will not elude our nation which surely deserves better than the predicament in which it now stands with regard to even the basic requisites of a secure and orderly life.

1. The Government which assumed office after the Presidential Election of 17th November 2005, inherited from the previous Administration a coherent and self-contained peace process. Its principal elements were the Ceasefire Agreement, the resolve of the parties to explore a political solution within the framework identified in the Oslo Communiqu`E9 of December 2002, the function of the Royal Norwegian Government as facilitator, the role of the Co-Chairs signifying the robust involvement of the international community, and the elements incorporated in the Tokyo Declaration of June 2003, which gave the fullest expression to values anchored in pluralism, democracy, and the entrenchment of human rights of all communities.

The new Government is in no way constrained by any of these elements. It has the undisputed right, and indeed the duty, in keeping with its mandate, to modify, refine, reconstruct or even totally reject any or all of the components of the pre-existing process if, in its own judgment, such action is necessary. The widest possible spectrum of choice is at the disposal of the new Government. But it has to make decisions. It cannot abdicate this responsibility, seeking refuge in policies which it has professedly disowned. The primary cause of the present stagnation is the absence of conscious and deliberate decision making. Competing factors and alternatives have to be assessed, and a clear stand taken.

This is, quite obviously, the need of the hour. It has been long overdue. Acceptance of responsibility and the making of decisions by the Government in power cannot be postponed any longer except at the greatest peril to the nation.

If the Government decides after careful reflection that the existing peace process should remain substantially intact and that it is the Government’s intention to implement this process without material change, it should do so with conviction. If, on the other hand, the Government decides that it cannot, in all conscience, subscribe to the underpinnings of the process, then, it must substitute, for the present process, a distinct and separate process which reflects its own outlook and policy. It is hardly fair by the nation for the Government indefinitely to continue doing neither; the current condition of drift is the inevitable consequence of this state of things.

2. The most explicit gap in the Government’s handling of the peace process is the total absence of any effective political component.

The peace process in Sri Lanka, admittedly, has had a chequered history. Hope and expectation, dominant during some periods, have given way to despair and dejection at other times. But, throughout successive phases of the peace process, during all its travails, there has been an unbroken thread. This consisted of clearly formulated proposals for the sharing of power as the basis of a negotiated political settlement. The form and degree of devolution, and the character of the structures by which it was sought to be accomplished, naturally varied from one formulation to another. Nevertheless, the constant factor was the commitment of different governments, whatever their political complexion, to a series of structured proposals for power sharing as the cornerstone of the suggested solution.

The lacuna at present lies in the reality that, at this time, there is no indication whatever, even in barest outline, of any scheme for power sharing which the Government holds itself prepared to adopt and promote as its own. This is without parallel in our contemporary history.

The unique nature of this lapse, and the gravity of its implications, are immediately apparent. The defence of the nation’s sovereignty and its territorial integrity represents, of course, a paramount concern. But there has not been, at any time, under any regime in Sri Lanka, military action bereft of a firm political initiative placed alongside it. During the period of former President J R Jayewardene the presence of the Indian Peace Keeping Force on the Island was complemented by the introduction of the Thirteenth Amendment establishing for the first time constitutionally empowered regional bodies, into the public law of Sri Lanka. Similarly, during the first People’s Alliance Government from 1994 to 2000, side by side with sporadic military initiatives there was an elaborate scheme for devolution of power which formed the centrepiece of the draft Constitution presented to Parliament on 3rd August 2000.

In vivid contrast to this pattern, the absence of even a basic document containing the barebones of a political proposal today is a grave deficiency. This lapse, unless it is immediately rectified, cannot but impact adversely on the substance and credibility of the peace process and cause serious erosion of goodwill in the international community at a decisive moment.

3. The preparation of a document of this kind is necessarily dependent on political ownership and direction. This cannot possibly be dispensed with.

For this reason it seems to us that the task of formulating a framework for the devolution of power cannot be entrusted appropriately to an Advisory Committee consisting of experts drawn from different disciplines and professional backgrounds. Even though the officials appointed have undoubted competence and stature, they can be expected to address their daunting task successfully only if they are provided at least with guidelines indicative of the parameters within which devolution is acceptable to the Government as a matter of policy.

Officials cannot produce a blueprint for power sharing in a political vacuum. Their contribution, however valuable, has necessarily to be preceded by clear-cut decisions of an essentially political nature which only the Government in power is entitled to make. These decisions will involve such issues as the structural framework of the State, the unit of devolution, the line of demarcation between functions of the central government and regional bodies, the acceptability or otherwise of shared competencies embedded at present in the Concurrent List, and an informed choice between symmetrical and asymmetrical approaches to the devolution of power.

Without the benefit of political guidance on these crucial issues, it is our view that a Committee of Experts is not, by any means, a viable instrument for accomplishment of the task which has been assigned to it.

4. The range and focus of the current discourse on issues relating to the peace process suffer from a regrettable distortion.

The point of departure for a healthy discourse at this critical moment requires a broadening, not a narrowing, of the subject matter of the discussion; and yet, the opposite is happening at present, with irreparable damage inflicted on the peace process.

The stagnant condition of the peace process cannot, in our view, be reversed without restoration of the emphasis on substantive political issues. These were the matters of overriding concern at several rounds of talks held by the United National Front Government with the LTTE from September 2002 until March 2003.

Unfortunately, however, in recent months there has been exclusive preoccupation with matters pertaining to the fragility of the Ceasefire Agreement. But, it seems to us, the Ceasefire Agreement is bound to be vulnerable in the circumstances which prevail at present. A ceasefire agreement, by its very nature, is not a permanent solution but merely a means of bringing about an atmosphere in which the substantive issues can be addressed by the parties with minimal strain or tension. In the absence of any realistic prospect of resuming the substantive political dialogue between the parties in the foreseeable future, increasing fragility of the ceasefire agreement is unavoidable. It is, therefore, a matter of the utmost priority to try to expand the frontiers of the discourse with a view to including, and concentrating on, political issues; but this is, unhappily, going by default.

In fact, the present position is even more unsatisfactory. This is because the current focus is not even on the Ceasefire Agreement, in all its aspects, but on one particular feature of it – namely, the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission.

This surprising, and highly damaging, aberration has the effect that, although forward movement with the peace process clearly calls for a significant opening out of frontiers, the area selected for coverage (intentionally or otherwise) is becoming progressively more restricted. This has served as a powerful impetus for the hardening of attitudes and a degree of polarisation which entails great jeopardy to the continuity of the peace process, even at the basic level.

5. We would identify the ad hoc nature of the Government’s approach to the peace process as a source of considerable weakness.

The Sri Lankan peace process comprises a variety of facets straddling political, economic, social, humanitarian and foreign relations issues, all of which are inextricably intertwined. We do not observe any consistent attempt by the Government to deal with all these issues within a properly integrated and comprehensive format.

A symptom of this is the tendency to assail and thereby weaken some elements of the process without adequately appreciating their origins or relevant avenues of development. For instance, many recent actions of the Government clearly demonstrate incomplete understanding that the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord constitutes the foundation of a process which has been carried forward for twenty years, with strips and layers added to it for the purpose of accommodating subsequent developments. It does not require much imagination to realise that such landmarks in the peace process as the Oslo Communiqu`E9 and the Tokyo Declaration, in terms of the principles and values they encapsulate, are linked logically to the seminal concepts contained in the provisions of the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord crafted by former President J R Jayewardene and former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. We are convinced that the Indian political and constitutional experience is even more directly relevant to us now than it was then.

This is why it is a matter of importance to the leadership of the United National Party to work assiduously to nurture and consolidate the relationship with India, in all its ramifications. This effort is rooted in depth of conviction that the goodwill and support of India are indispensable in achieving a durable political solution to the Island’s ethnic conflict.

6. We are of opinion that lack of clarity in demarcating the scope of the functions of the Peace Secretariat, in relation to other agencies and functionaries of the Government, has unwittingly debilitated several useful initiatives by the Peace Secretariat.

There has been widespread comment in recent weeks that many statements issued, and a host of matters handled, by the Peace Secretariat ought more appropriately to fall within the sphere of responsibility of other officials or departments of the Government. Especially at this time, the focus and identity of the Peace Secretariat must be undiluted. A minimum condition of the potential for success is that the work of the Peace Secretariat must at all times have an orientation conducive to its essential peace building function. While security related matters often call for communication with the public, these issues are best dealt with by officials belonging to the defence establishment.

It is a matter of the utmost urgency at this time to address in earnest the shortcomings of the peace process and to put in place suitable remedies before irretrievable harm is done to the security and wellbeing of the nation.