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By Professor Jayadeva Uyangoda

Sri Lanka’s peace process that began in 2002 continues to go deep in a serious crisis. An undeclared war between the armed forces of the Sri Lankan government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) is intensifying every day. In the escalating violence, civilians have become victims to claymore mine attacks. Reports of civilian killings by unidentified death squads operating in the Northern and Eastern provinces have been increasing. Now it is really a dirty war in which civilian populations are deliberately targeted, killed and terrorized while the perpetrators deny responsibility.

The Cease-fire Agreement and the presence of the international Monitoring Mission are no longer effective instruments to arrest the spiral of violence or the sliding back to war. One can even say that the war has actually begun. If that is the case, Sri Lanka needs new initiatives by the international community and the government to prevent the war from developing into a catastrophic phase.

Geneva

These extremely negative developments are taking place in the backdrop of recent failure of the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE re-start the stalled peace process. The first such attempt under the government of President Mahinda Rajapakse was made in February this year in Geneva. Facilitated by the Norwegian peace brokers, the two sides met there after an absence of direct talks for three years. The immediate context for the Geneva meeting was the increasing violations of the CFA and the threat of the resumption of full scale-war in consequent to such violations.

In Geneva the two sides agreed to renew their commitment to honour the CFA fully and take immediate steps to prevent future violations. But that was a pledge that remained valid only on paper. Within two weeks of the Geneva Accord, killings returned on a larger scale, each side blaming the other for re-escalating violence.

Listing the LTTE as a terrorist entity by the European Union on May 29 occurred in the backdrop of an increasing risk of full-scale hostilities breaking out. The EU statement on the listing said that this decision should not surprise anybody because the LTTE had systematically ignored prior warnings. The EU seems to have been quite concerned with what they saw as the LTTE’s disregard of the EU’s repeated insistence that the parties in Sri Lanka ‘show commitment and responsibility towards the peace process and refrain from actions that could endanger a peaceful resolution and political settlement of the conflict.’

Co-Chairs

The meeting of the Co-Chairs – the EU, USA, Norway and Japan – which took place a few days later blamed the Sri Lankan government as well as the LTTE for the crisis and insisted that both parties should take immediate steps to ‘reverse the deteriorating situation and put the country back on the road to peace.’ The Co-Chair statement demanded from the LTTE to re-enter the negotiating process, renounce terrorism and violence and ‘be willing to make the political compromises necessary for a political solution within a united Sri Lanka.’ From the government, the Co-Chairs demanded that it must address the legitimate grievances of the Tamils, take steps to prevent acts of terrorism by armed groups and protect Tamil civilians throughout the country.

More importantly, the Co-Chairs insisted that the Sri Lankan government ‘show that it is ready to make the dramatic political changes to bring about a new system of governance which will enhance the rights of all Sri Lankans.’ The formulation ‘dramatic political changes’ meant federalist state reforms. There is an international consensus that federalism is the only alternative to Tamil separatism and Sinhalese unitarism

If the Co-Chairs thought that by being ‘tough’ on both sides, they could pressurise them back to the negotiation table, it was only a short-lived hope. Responding to intense international pressure, the LTTE agreed to meet with the government delegation in Oslo on June 08. The two delegations did go to Oslo. The most unexpected happened in the morning of June 08 when the LTTE delegation, led by its head of the Political Wing, refused to meet the government delegation. The LTTE’s explanation was that since the government had sent a junior official delegation, its Head of the Political Wing would not meet them.

The government responded to this unexpected move by the LTTE by recalling its team back to Colombo. Most embarrassed, the Norwegian facilitators fired a letter to the government and LTTE leaders demanding them to re-commit themselves to the CFA and ensure the security of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM). As the things stand now, the international actors are realizing that they have a little or no role to play in re-convening Sri Lanka’s peace process. It may be the case that the internationals are looking for an honourable exit strategy.

Oslo Talks

Why did the LTTE go back on their word in Oslo by not taking part in negotiations with the Sri Lankan government delegation, when they had promised the Norwegians that their intention of coming to Oslo was to resume talks with the government?

Excuses given by the LTTE apart, it appears that the LTTE had implemented in Oslo a major political decision to terminate the peace process that began in 2002. Actually, this peace process has been in crisis for about three years and the crisis intensified particularly during the past six months in a context of regime change. Both the government and the LTTE have repeatedly expressed deep dissatisfaction with the peace process, for their own specific reasons. The present Sri Lankan government came in to power six months ago on a Sinhalese nationalist platform promising the electorate that it would amend the CFA and start a new peace process. The thinking of the present government has been that the peace process, initiated in 2002 by the then United National Front government, accorded unnecessary legitimacy to the LTTE, gave the LTTE many concessions placing at risk national security and sovereignty. The LTTE’s negative assessment of the peace process is based on the view that it did not produce any political outcome favourable to them.

The EU ban appears to have provided the context for the LTTE to bring the 2002 peace process to a political end, without saying it in writing or officially announcing it. The Oslo Communiqué which S. P. Thamilselvam, the LTTE’s Political Head, announced on June 10 was a further step in the direction of a unilateral path that the LTTE leadership seems to explore. The LTTE’s unilateralism is a direct response to the EU ban. It seems to entail either separating the EU from Sri Lanka’s peace process or creating conditions for the UN, the world body, to engage in Sri Lanka in new conditions of dramatically increasing violence.

Dilemmas

It appears that in the context of the current crisis of 2002 peace process, which has now approached what may be seen as its final phase, the Sri Lankan government, the LTTE and the international community are facing three sets of dilemmas.

For the Sri Lankan government, the dilemma is to prevent a major war breaking out while succeeding in weakening the LTTE militarily and politically. The government does not want to be seen by the international community as taking any direct initiative to bring the 2002 peace process to a formal end. It wants to be in the good books of the international community. Meanwhile, there are groups within the government that continue to argue that the opportune time has come to defeat the LTTE militarily. The radical Sinhalese Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna, a key member of the ruing coalition with 39 parliamentary seats, has launched a campaign saying that ‘enough is enough’ and telling the government to move in the direction of defeating ‘LTTE terrorism’ once and for all. They and sections of the military make the point that the war with the LTTE is necessary and winnable.

However, President Rajapakse appears to be cautious about a large-scale war. Politicians know that a big war will give an opportunity for the LTTE to launch massively destructive attacks on the economic and infrastructure installations. Maintaining the low intensity war leading to the outcome of weakening the LTTE’s offensive capacity seems to be the government’s preferred option for the moment. But, will it really work?

The LTTE’s calculations seem to be quite interesting too. Although not officially stated, they have bid farewell to the 2002 peace process. The LTTE’s dilemma is essentially about what next. The LTTE too does not want to be blamed for unilaterally initiating the next phase of war. Probably, the LTTE does not want a full-scale war, because it will certainly destroy the trappings of the parallel state which they have established over during the past few years. But at the same time, the government’s low intensity offensive has hurt the LTTE militarily. With the defection of Karuna, the LTTE’s military commander in the Eastern Province to the side of the government military in 2004, the LTTE’s military strength and control of the Eastern province has suffered a considerable setback. With the assistance of the Karuna group and other armed groups, a number of LTTE’s local military commanders as well as key civilian supporters have been assassinated in recent months.

The LTTE’s claim that it can protect the Tamil civilians is also coming under serious doubt, particularly in the context of continuing abduction and killing of pro-LTTE civilians by anti-LTTE armed groups. The government has also begun a policy of launching retaliatory air and artillery strikes against the LTTE in response to the LTTE’s offensive actions. Thus from the LTTE’s perspective too, a major war seems to be a necessity. But, who takes the first initiative? This is one of LTTE’s current dilemmas. It seems that the LTTE would prefer provoking the government to take the first step towards all-out war, with the hope that a massive retaliatory attack would be justified in the eyes of the world. Chilling stuff, indeed.

The LTTE’s new attitude towards the international community is worth studying. After the EU ban, the LTTE seems to be exploring possibilities of re-defining the role of the international community in Sri Lanka. The LTTE has also realized the limited nature of the role of Norway as peace facilitator in Sri Lanka. From the LTTE’s perspective, Norway has not been able to ensure that the Sri Lankan government implemented promises made at negotiations. The LTTE might look for a bigger power, with the capacity for power mediation. Yet, there are probably no volunteers to take up this responsibility, particularly in view of the international community’s frustration and disappointment with both the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE.

Verification

In this backdrop, the international custodians of Sri Lanka’s peace process do not seem to have many options. In banning the LTTE and in the Tokyo statement, the international community re-asserted its role in Sri Lanka. But there are limits to what the externals can do especially when the domestic actors in Sri Lanka are not in a mood to work together for peace. The UN might be the next in line to get involved, though reluctantly, Sri Lankan conflict.

Meanwhile, the escalating dirty war in Sri Lanka has opened up space for a new kind of role for the international community. It entails the setting up of an international verification commission to investigate incidents of violence against civilians. Although there have been many incidents of gruesome violence against Sinhalese as well as Tamil civilians in recent months and weeks, including the massacre of Sinhalese bus passengers the other day, the SLMM does not have power or capacity to conduct thorough investigations, and positively identify the perpetrators. While the government and LTTE exchange charges and counter-charges about responsibility for such acts of war crime, the presence of other armed groups in the Northern and Eastern provinces has made such violence against civilians a crime with impunity.

It is time now to think about an international verification commission for Sri Lanka with powers of investigation and compliance. That would be small, but necessary step towards humanizing a conflict that looks truly intractable. [www.focusLanka.org]