The Tamil and the Tiger
by Kumar David
Slovo and First were no less courageous in their unrelenting defiance
of apartheid than Mandela or Sisulu. It would therefore, for like reason,
be egregiously untruthful to say that no Sinhalese can take an
enduring stand, with equal courage, against a long history of
chauvinist ethno-politics in our social and political mainstream.
It would, however, be reasonable to assume that their visceral images
will not have the same emotive content as a Tamil who suffered the
horrors of 1983, or military excess in the 1970s and 1980s, or fretted
over perceptions of life-long humiliation.
An endeavour to empathise with this state of mind will go some way in
helping the Sinhalese community gain a holistic appreciation of what
many see as a baffling contradiction in the complicated nexus between
the Tamil and the Tiger. Politically informed Sinhalese simply cannot
understand why the LTTE has such a substantial degree of support
among Tamils (exactly how substantial is anyone's guess until a free
and fair election takes place) despite the hard time they face in
holding on to some semblance of democratic and human rights in the
land of the Tiger.
What the rest of this article says is palpably obvious to most Tamils
and it is not breathtaking news for the sensitive Sinhalese either. But it
is not quite so candidly and blandly stated, without apologetic frills, in
the columns of newspapers. So it is time to say it, to let the catharsis
flow and to invite responses.
In his emotive heart the Sri Lankan Tamil feels that the Tigers have
allowed him to stand up again. There are two sides to this. He feels
that the humiliation and the beatings have been banished, that
another 1983 won't happen for fear of reprisals and that the army
cannot run amok again in Tamil areas without risking a bloody nose.
The balance of terror leads to mutual deterrence, the Cold War has
taught us.
Secondly, in his conscious mind he reckons that there would never
have been any serious interest on the part of the national political
establishment of whatever hue, to even recognise an ethnic
conundrum, let alone negotiate a settlement, unless the Tigers had
fought the army to a standstill. Both of these, in the minds of the
Tamils, have been won on the battlefield. This I think I can say without
risking much rebuttal, is the judgment of the great majority, including
those who are not, and never have been, fellow travellers of the LTTE.
For this reason, the Tamil people will not settle their accounts with the
Tamil Tigers until they have first settled their accounts with the Sinhala
State.
There are indeed a lot of accounts to settle on both balance-sheets;
with the former stakeholder, about the hegemony of the rights of the
people over and above the gains and benefits for a military outfit; with
the latter stakeholder, about the form and content of a new
constitutional dispensation.
Now true, this strictly serial ordering of events is a little simplified, the
world is never entirely linear, but it does get an important point across.
The better we understand this correlation of variables the better we
can deal with both sides of the equation and overlap progress on both
issues.
To this end one consideration is especially paramount; the political
powers-that-be must maximise devolution short and long term, and
minimise permitted restrictions on democracy in the interim
arrangements. Unfortunately, the thinking in the government and the
South seems rather the opposite - mean on devolution and generous
on letting the Tigers chew on the democratic rights and institutions of
the denizens of the Northern and Eastern Provinces.
This is the worst kind of myopia. Giving the Tamil people the highest
possible degree of autonomy to manage their own affairs is the only
way they can grow and develop and put right whatever accounts they
need to put right.
Neither the Sinhalese nor the State can sort out their internal
problems, but they can help. How? Simply by insisting on minimal
restrictions, for the shortest necessary interim period, on elected
bodies, representative mechanisms, internationally supervised
freedoms of assembly, press and organisation, and so on in exchange
for a highly devolved constitutional arrangement.
The obsession in the South seems to be that devolution, incorporating
a high degree of autonomy - Asymmetrical Devolution in the best case
- will be the first step towards secession. This is wide of the mark
intrinsically, but also because Thamil Eelam is not possible without
international support and Indian complicity.
The manifest ebb in international support for secession can turn to
flood again only in the converse situation, that is, only if it becomes
clear to the outside world that substantial autonomy to manage their
own affairs is being denied to the Tamils.
As for India, surely the blast that dispatched Rajiv Gandhi also
interned in his casket any hope of Eelam. Can a febrile outfit in a
pint-sized island murder a past and potential future prime minister of
India and not pay the crippling price of forever relinquishing its fondest
dreams?
In recent weeks the door to devolution has opened wider in the South
as well. The JVP and the JHU sought to turn the Local Government
elections into a referendum on the government's backsliding on
several provisions included in Mr Rajapaksa's presidential
election-manifesto as a consequence of agreements reached with the
two parties.
No doubt it was some fireworks from the Tigers, costly in military lives
that motivated the President, very wisely, to "backslide", if you want to
call it that. Notwithstanding this commonsense, the JVP alleged at its
12,000 meetings that the "unitary State" concept was likely to go the
way of the rest; imagine the fanfare from the rooftops if the JVP and
JHU had scored handsomely.
The upshot is that it is now fairly obvious that had Mr Rajapaksa said,
before the Local Government elections, that he was interested in
looking into both unitary and federal options, the outcome of the
JVP-JHU beckoned "referendum" would have been no different. The
shackles are now removed and he should go forward boldly with an
open mind. [Source: SundayObserver]
