Stop the killings pronto!
By Jayadeva Uyangoda
The assassination of Mr. Lakshman Kadirgamar is by far the most serious threat
to Sri Lanka’s fragile peace process. Although the LTTE has denied its
involvement in this grave violation of the Ceasefire Agreement, the government
and almost everybody else blame the LTTE. And indeed, it is exceedingly difficult
for the LTTE to establish its innocence over this high-profile killing.
It needs to be noted that the government of President Kumaratunga handled the
crisis in the aftermath of this shocking act of public violence with patience and
maturity.
The government did not allow space for any interested party to take to
provocative action. People of all communities also reacted to this critical situation
with calm. The question now being raised everywhere is: Whither Sri Lanka’s
peace process? This is a question that needs to be explored with greater patience
and calm.
Questions
Since the government blames the LTTE for this assassination, it is important for
the government to ask one or two fundamental questions about it. Why was this
assassination carried out at this particular moment? What is the message
delivered to the government through this assassination? While condemning this
killing in the strongest possible terms, no informed citizen can also wish away
these questions.
The context of government-LTTE relations during the past few weeks was
immediately characterised by the legal and political setbacks that the P-TOMS
agreement suffered.
The process that led to the signing of it in July was a difficult one. The LTTE’s
reaction to the temporary invalidation of the P-TOMS agreement was one of both
anger and frustration. As I learned from individuals who were familiar with the
LTTE’s thinking on this issue as well as the LTTE’s public statements, they
understood it as another ‘act of deception’ by the ‘Sinhalese politicians.’
They also saw it as ‘yet another instance’ of the Sinhalese polity having
demonstrated its ‘unwillingness to treat the Tamils as equals’ and ‘incapacity to
reform the state.’ They also saw in the setbacks to the post-tsunami joint
mechanism process an ascendance of Sinhalese nationalist forces who would
want to ‘thrust a war on the Tamil people.’ Whether these reactions are correct or
not, the government cannot ignore them. These are perceptions and
understandings that continue to shape the LTTE’s political as well as military
relations with the government and the state in the period ahead.
The above perceptions have also emerged in a contest of deep mistrust the LTTE
has developed towards the present government. There is a particular history to
this. Despite that history of hostility, after the tsunami of December 26, there
emerged an unprecedented opportunity for the two sides to build trust, to work
together and develop a working relationship towards returning to the negotiation
process.
Despite many attempts made by the international community and civil society
groups towards that end, it did not happen. After much acrimony and hesitation,
they managed to negotiate the P-TOMS agreement. It is a pity that the two sides
do not seem to have used the P-TOMS negotiations to establish trust at the
political level.
CFA Violations
The continuing violation of the ceasefire agreement and escalating violence in the
Eastern province provided the other dimension of the context for events that led to
the assassination of Mr. Kadirgamar. The LTTE is largely blamed by the
government for most of these violations. On the other hand, the LTTE has blamed
the Karuna faction, the ‘paramilitary’ groups and the military intelligence, alleging
that all work in collusion to weaken them.
Neither the government nor the international community could develop a
mechanism to control this spiralling violence which everybody knew would critically
endanger, sooner than later, the CFA and the entire peace process. In fact, this
cycle of violence exposed the limitations of the capacity of government, the LTTE,
the international community and civil society in managing a ceasefire process in
the absence of negotiations. The greatest challenge that Sri Lanka’s peace
process began to face after April 2003 has been about sustaining the ceasefire
agreement without a process of negotiations and high-level political between the
state and the LTTE. This is an issue that requires serious attention of all those
committed to preventing Sri Lanka from relapsing to war.
The emerging situation in the country is certainly one of very grave crisis. There
can be more events of violence in the country, particularly in the North and East,
further reducing the already-shrinking space for the CFA to function. No sane
person would wish another phase of war; yet the logic of the present moment
poses a real threat of war in Sri Lanka.
There is absolutely no point in blaming this party or that once the full-scale
hostilities began. It is now the time to prevent Sri Lanka from relapsing to war. This
places a tremendous political responsibility on the government, the international
custodians of Sri Lanka’s peace and the civil society. Once the grieving is over,
serious political thinking becomes the need of the day.
A process of such thinking should begin with the view, however difficult it may
sound, that the assassination of Mr. Kadirgamar is not a provocative invitation to
return to war.
Meanwhile, the immediate resumption of talks between the government and the
LTTE is not possible. It seems that a lot of anger has built on both sides. There is
no clear agenda for talks either. The government and the international community
is very likely to explore domestic and international sanctions against the LTTE in
order that they be accountable for their actions. Sanctions may or may not work.
The overall challenge is about the difficult task of providing incentives to the
LTTE, or its political wing, to stay on the path of political engagement and
disincentives to resort to military action by the military wing even in a limited
manner. [Courtesy: Daily Mirror]