Post-assassination politics cause genuine concern for peace
By Professor Karthigesu Sivathamby
The assassination of Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar has impacted harshly
on the tenuous political structures in Sri Lanka and thrown up in magnified
proportions the lacunae in the system. More than that, it brings out facets of the Sri
Lankan psyche – exploiting anything, even the killing of a man who mattered, to stir
up the cauldron of ethnic hatred.
Inquiries relating to the death of Kadirgamar are not yet concluded and the police,
quite understandably, are said to be moving silently towards the identification of the
culprits. And very rightly, a period of emergency has been declared and necessarily
extended to enable the law enforcement authorities to make their investigations
thorough and complete.
But unfortunately the political fallout of this killing has not been encouraging. It has
not affirmed in our minds that schemers have stopped trying to achieve partisan
gain out of this incident. The substantive effects of their manipulation can be seen
very well even as this article is being written, two weeks after the killing.
Two points of political significance begin to assert their importance. The first is in
relation to the role played by the Sinhala print and electronic media, especially radio,
in relation to the assassination.
A little after the assassination became public, the police was quite sure who, in their
opinion, the culprits were. However, when the police began pointing fingers, the
politicians were very cautious in not being vituperative in their condemnation. The
media on the other hand, in their reports and broadcasts were the opposite. They
were quite sure about the identity of the ‘assailants’ and the cacophony built up over
the media was such that it became impossible even for more sober and circumspect
politicians to maintain a diplomatic balance in their statements. So the politicians –
especially the clamourers – too joined the media chorus and began making full
political use of what the media was saying.
The coverage itself was interesting with the press and the electronic media
interacting with each other on establishing the identity of the assassin. Radio
programmes asserted they were following the newspapers which had named the
LTTE as the perpetrators, while the newspapers reversed the process by sourcing
their comments to the radio. The ultimate effect of all this was the LTTE’s hand in
the murder metamorphosed from an allegation to a fact beyond all dispute.
The LTTE, for its part, has denied the allegations, but given the atmosphere of
mistrust and propaganda that has been built for years, it will take some time for the
Tigers to prove their case. But it is not the question of claims and counterclaims that
are at issue now. What is at issue is that the Sinhala media – both radio and the
press – has not brought to the notice of the average Sinhala listener/reader, the
killing of LTTE cadres and supporters taking place in the north and east ever since
the Karuna affair began.
Sinhala listeners mostly speak only about the approximately 3000 violations of the
CFA committed by the LTTE, while there is not a single reference to complaints
made by the Tigers. This is a matter of great importance because opinion formation
at the public level is going to be a decisive factor in creating the background
required for open negotiations. Even a cursory interest in the views of listener-
participants at these radio programmes reveals the ignorance of the average
Sinhala listener of the ceasefire violations by the military, of which the LTTE has
complained. One listener asked, “How is it that the security forces are watching on
without reacting to the 3000 odd violations?”
The simple truth is that the Sinhala media is not playing its role fairly and squarely,
which is regrettable. When discussions take place in Sinhala on the question of
peace initiatives I have heard certain big names in the field of peace politics making
apologetic references to the LTTE, whereas in the English or Tamil media, they
speak about the objective difficulties on the Tamil side as well. This type of
communication bias is not going to help in understanding the point of view of all
sides, let alone address the question of peace.
The second point relates to direct talks between the government and the LTTE
facilitated by the Norwegians, which are reportedly on the cards. The message that
is beamed by the media is that if direct talks are going to be held, the implications
will be quite dangerous. The programme Subarati on the SLBC’s Sinhala service
went so far as to ask the public what should be talked about or demanded at the
negotiations. The evening news bulletin from the same station carried as headline
news that most people wanted the disarming of the LTTE thereby implying the
government should take it up at the talks. Is there any other meaning discernable in
such a news item being broadcast over a state radio channel?
The above-mentioned matters are carried against a background of misreported
news and opinion pieces connected with internal wars overseas. Reports of the IRA’
s decision to give up its arms struggle, and more importantly, the agreement of the
people of Aceh to a ceasefire, have been carried copiously, but without any
reference to the withdrawals made on the part of the governments of the United
Kingdom and Indonesia respectively. Unfortunately we do not have in Sri Lankan
universities, full-fledged departments of communication studies. Nor do our
departments of sociology summon up enough courage to carry out objective
analyses of the ethnic war and how it is reported in the media. Similarly, the NGOs
too do not have a system of communication research. (I wonder why these well-
meaning NGOs and those who come on air on their behalf do not take up this
challenge.) Therefore, to any serious student of communication studies, as far as
representing the ethnic war in the Sinhala state media goes, there is “something
rotten in the state of Denmark.”
The dangerous results of this type of partisan opinion building were very evident
when the vote was taken in parliament in August on the extension of the state of
emergency. Is it not true that there was an undeniable communal divide in the voting
pattern? The TNA voted against, and the SLMC (in spite of its ambiguous positions
at crucial moments), chose not to vote for the extension of the emergency either. In
other words, the Tamils and Muslims felt the state of emergency could be used
against members of their communities.
If one is seriously interested in a national rapprochement, these factors of and in
communication should be carefully taken note of. Frankly, as the media is acting
now is not the way a responsible fourth estate readies people for genuine peace.
It does not take much to find out why these war drums are beaten. It is because of
the uncertainty in the mood of the electorate before an election – whether
presidential or parliamentary. Has it not been a fact that Kadirgamar’s assassination
was virtually taken over by the sandanaya group – the SLFP and JVP – to malign
the candidacy of Ranil Wickremesinghe?
Is it not equally true that electioneering by Mahinda Rajapakse led him to make
statements, ignoring the historical context, comparing the Kadirgamar killing with the
acts of ‘terrorism’ of 9/11 (United States) and 7/7 (Britain). His call for a stoppage of
“international terror” implied that it is the same ‘terror,’ which is present in Sri Lanka.
These statements broadcast and printed by the media, immediately raise the
question of credibility. Whereas on the one hand the presidential secretariat has
been very methodical in its approach to the problem of resurrecting negotiations, the
government has not evidently shared it. The presidential secretariat clearly stated
that talks would be confined to the implementation of the CFA – nothing more,
nothing less. The JVP in its desire to come back into the fold says that not only the
LTTE but also all the political forces in Sri Lanka, which of course include them,
have to be around the negotiating table.
All these indicate the atmosphere for reasoned discussion has already begun to
erode. It was significant that immediately after the assassination when there was an
urgent call for restarting the dialogue nobody spoke against the Norwegian
facilitators. But now even those voices are heard and the press and radio report
them in such a manner that anxieties of the public are rekindled.
By no stretch of imagination is this healthy state of affairs. Twenty-five years of the
ethnic war has not only criminalised our social behaviour, but our mental attitudes
and dispositions as well.
[Courtesy: Northeastern Monthly - September 1, 2005]