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By D.B.S.JEYARAJ
Dark clouds like the devastation caused by the Tsunami waves too have their silver linings. One positively
overwhelming feature has been the surge of humanitarian goodwill surfacing in the aftermath of the
tsunami upsurge. Common disaster seems to have awakened Sri Lankans to the fact that they are all
children of one land sharing a common destiny. It is to be hoped that selfish manipulation by the parasitic
political class does not affect this sense of oneness brought about by a humanitarian tragedy.
Among the many unrealised "benefits" of the tsunami disaster relates to resumption of war. Hostilities
breaking out in the first quarter of 2005 between Sri Lankan government forces and the Liberation Tigers
of Tamil Eelam was a distinct possibility before tsunami. The killer waves of last December 26th have
drastically altered that scenario. The best laid plans of men (and mice) go awry in the face of almighty
mother nature. Even the LTTE is now forced to change its earlier plans. Those of us aware earlier of
imminent war can only heave a sigh of relief and be thankful that it has at least been suspended even if
not cancelled on account of tsunami waves.
Tiger supremo Velupillai Pirapakaran sent a clear signal to President Chandrika Kumaratunga in his "
Maaveerar Naal" (Great Heroes Day) speech of Nov 27th 2004. He spoke of resuming the "freedom
struggle" if certain developments did not occur. The tiger leader was only "reading" the speech. Its author
LTTE political adviser Anton Balasingham did not mince words while addressing a Tamil gathering in
London on the same day. Elaborating on the speech he himself had written Balasingham stated ominously
" Pirapakaran is ready for war".
An agitated Chandrika Kumaratunga feared an immediate outbreak of war. She desperately contacted
Oslo. The Norwegians "shuttle - cocked" themselves between Colombo and Kilinochchi . They obtained
assurances from the LTTE that there was no chance of war flaring up immediately. Once this assurance
was obtained Kumaratunga relaxed and went back to business as usual. The stalemate over the Internal
Self - Governing Authority issue continued. The Government plagued by internal dissension over the
ISGA issue plodded on complacently regardless of the serious situation that was evolving.
All however was not quiet on the tiger front. The LTTE had assured Oslo that war would not break out and
was certainly bound by that assurance. The lack of a proper and positive response by Kumaratunga to
the Nov 27th address made the tigers angry. It was felt that the stakes should be raised and that Colombo
be given a severe jolt. Tiger leader Pirapakaran began summoning several key overseas activists of the
LTTE to the Wanni. They were told very clearly of future plans. Eruption of war was a strong possibility.
The tiger chief was clear on one thing. "We will not start it . This time the first shot wont be fired by us" he
told his aides.
This was not all. 138 tiger operatives from 14 Countries too convened at Kilinochchi in mid - December.
They were members of the Tamil Diaspora in USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Britain,
France, Germany, Italy, Switzerland, Netherlands, Denmark, Norway and Sweden. These persons
comprising men and women were involved in various propaganda activities overseas. The Canadian
contingent numbered 20.
The propagandists were housed in the premises of the LTTE's Thooyavan Political Science Academy at
the former farm school in Vatakachchi from Dec 9th to 23rd. They underwent a fortnightly course in
politics and propaganda methods. According to participants they had to engage in physical training
activities in the morning. Thereafter a series of lectures on various topics was held. Some LTTE
academics as well as people like Thamilselvan, Para, Nadesan, Ilankumaran, Soosai etc addressed them.
They were also given a staggered tour of different LTTE installations and institutions like the tiger courts,
Police stations, banks, administrative divisions, land and sea tiger bases, Orphanages, rehabilitation
ventures, training schools etc.
At the end of it all the LTTE chief attended the final ceremony with his wife. There was prize giving where
certificates were given to the participants. After a grand dinner the tiger chief answered questions from the
participants. The most important ones related to the possibility of war. Pirapakaran was frank. He did not
rule it out. The only assurance was that the tigers would not start it this time. The LTTE leader told the
participants that the objective of the workshop was to equip them with a comprehensive grasp of the
issues at hand.
They were required to justify the war if and when it broke out to the international community. They were
also required to indoctrinate the Tamil Diaspora systematically about the inevitability of war. This was to
be done in such a way that the outbreak of war should not be a sudden shock to the people. A momentum
for war should be built up alongside regular fund raising. The propagandists should prepare the Tamil
public for war, the participants were told.
It appeared that the LTTE had a game plan. After "Thaipongal" (Jan 14th) the tigers were planning to
formally announce through Norway their withdrawal from the ceasefire from Feb 23rd 2005. The period of
notice would exceed the stipulated 14 days. Though the tigers would not be bound by the ceasefire after
Feb 23rd the LTTE would not engage in any unilateral military action but watch develops carefully in a
state of military preparedness. The future would depend on how the Sri Lankan government and the
International community reacted and responded. The LTTE perspective was that Kumaratunga needed
"athirchi vaithiyam " (shock treatment)for her to move meaningfully on the ISGA demand.
When the ceasefire came into force in 2002 and talks commenced LTTE ideologue Anton Balasingham
told a trusted Catholic clergyman that the "thalaiver" (Leader) had given him three years to achieve a
peaceful settlement. If Balasingham could not deliver the goods within that period then "matters should be
left to him" (Vishayathai ennattai vittidungo)Pirapakaran had then said. Those aware of this three year
stipulation had in recent times been wracking their brains to ascertain the possible date of its intended
expiry.
Was it Dec 25th 2004? or Feb 23rd 2005? or Sep 16th 2005?The LTTE's unilateral ceasefire had come
into effect from Dec 25th 2001; the official ceasefire was from Feb 23rd 2002. The first round of Govt -
LTTE direct talks began on Sep 16th, 2002. So from which date was Pirapakaran calculating his three
years was the question. Now the answer seemed clear. It was Feb 23rd the date of the official ceasefire.
Against this backdrop the Balasingham- Catholic priest anecdote also seemed a valid pointer.
The situation therefore was extremely precarious for Sri Lanka on Christmas Day even the Country's
Executive President was holidaying merrily in London. Even her senior ministers were out of the Country
blissfully unaware of the bombshell announcement to be made on Dec 27th - exactly one month after
Pirapakarans Maaveerar speech - that the LTTE was dissatisfied about progress made on the peace
front after the LTTE leaders address.. The tsunami waves of Dec 26th changed all things "utterly". The
tsunami devastation is certainly terrible but the prospect of protracted warfare would have been even
worse in the long run.
Now the consequences of tsunami have taken over. The question of opting out of the ceasefire or
resuming war has receded into the background. The paramount consideration is that of alleviating the
suffering misery of afflicted people. The North - Eastern province coming under the LTTE sphere of
influence is severely affected. So the LTTE is compelled to revise priorities in its scheme of things. The
Tamil people living in Sri Lanka or abroad will not accept it. The International community will not approve it.
The focus now is to provide relief, rehabilitation and later on relocation and reconstruction. Under these
circumstances a return to war by the LTTE at present is entirely out of the reckoning.
President Kumaratunga seems sure of it and has stated so openly in what seemed an _expression of "bad
taste" at this juncture. The Tamil media has flayed her for "gloating" over what is termed as the
discomfiture of the LTTE because of tsunami. While speculating on whether the tigers will go to war or not
the predominantly "Sinhala" south has failed to realise that resumption of war is a non - option for
Colombo also. Even if the Sinhala hawks want war the International Community will not allow it. Besides the
battering given to military and naval installations in the North, East and South by lashing tsunami waves
rule out the war option for now to the Government too.
While Kumaratunga is right about the LTTE being unable to go to war at this juncture the danger is that
she seems to have arrived at this conclusion for the wrong reason. Kumaratunga like many others in the
South and elsewhere is under the impression that tsunami waves have given the LTTE an irredeemable
battering. The unwillingness of the tigers to go to war at this time is attributed to grave inability caused by
tsunami.
This simply is not true. The assumption either due to misinformation or wishful thinking that the tigers have
taken a fatal beating is erroneous. While the LTTE has certainly sustained some damage it is not a
crippling blow. The bulk of its military and naval assets and resources along the North - Eastern coast is
safe. Taking any controversial decision or making any bold move on the basis that the sea tigers have
been reduced to zero is downright dangerous.
Kumaratunga and others seem to be thinking that 2500 to 3000 tigers have been killed and that
hundreds of marine vessels are destroyed. Naval bases too are devastated it is felt. Any argument to the
contrary is disbelieved. When this writer told a Western diplomat that the sea tigers are relatively intact the
skeptical response was "How is that possible when Mullaitheevu has taken a battering"? The answer to
that was simple. "The tiger navy did not get battered because it was not there".
The LTTE naval unit or sea tigers is of vital importance. It is the movements lifeline helping to bring in
supplies and armaments. The naval stronghold has been for many years that stretch of north - eastern
territory between Chundukulam and Nayaary comprising essentially the Mullaitheevu district coast. The
premier naval bases in these areas are in Chundikulam, Chalai, Karaichikudiyiruppu, Semmalai,
Kumilamunai etc. Other naval bases are in Sampur, Verugal, Kadiraveli, Paalsenai, Vaaharai,
Kattaikaadu, Uduthurai, Pooneryn, Nachikkudah etc.. The Mullaitheevu zone with the Chalai base complex
however is the most important.
The truth however is that the tigers never keep their marine vessels or station personnel along the coast.
The LTTE has been fighting the Sri Lankan forces for decades. Colombo has a powerful navy and air
force. Keeping the ships and boats or housing naval detachments along the coast is an invitation for
trouble. The air force bombards and the navy shells the Mullaitheevu coast regularly and intensively. Yet
these actions have seldom dented tiger capability. Only the poor fisher folk along the coast are affected.
Apart from the sea and air danger the LTTE has always been wary of a sudden coastal invasion by the
"enemy". This has been so since the security forces executed a clandestine coastal operation in Mutur
more than a decade ago. The forces made a sudden landing, infiltrated tiger lines along the beach and
attacked LTTE camps killing several cadres. The tigers have also followed Israeli activity in taking out their
perceived opponents and realise fully the vulnerability of the coast.
So the tigers have been careful in not maintaining a strong permanent presence along the coast though
the coast is integral to its existence and war effort. The practice has been to keep sea tiger personnel in
the hinterland and transport them to the littoral whenever and wherever necessary. The personnel in large
numbers are housed in camps in the interior. The single largest naval detachment for example is in the
agrarian area of Viswamadu and not anywhere on the coast. Only a small number remain in the immediate
vicinity of the sea. The greater part of sea tigers assemble quickly when necessary and promptly board
vessels.
The marine vessels of the LTTE are usually "dry docked" and nor left on the water or waters edge along
the coast. The tigers have constructed fortified underground bunkers in the hinterland capable of housing
even 40 to 70 foot Vessels. The bulk of the boats however are 21 ft in length. After being deployed in the
sea the vessels return to coast and move swiftly through natural coves and artificially enhanced
waterways to well - constructed launch - ramps. They are then hoisted on or linked to trailered vehicles
that take them along roads to the underground bunkers and garage them. Similarly the trailer vehicles
bring the marine vessels back to the waters edge in the launch ramps when required for sailing. This kind
of procedure is quite common in the west where boats are hauled to the interior during "winterisation".
The LTTE's marine citadel at Chalai is not a single structure but a veritable complex. Despite constant
reference in the media to the sea tiger base in Chalai the truth is that there are no major structures along
the beach front. The base is widely dispersed and consists of different camouflaged structures in
designated areas in the interior . The vessels either in bunkers or at camouflaged waterways are never
kept in large numbers at a single location. Those in Chalai are said to be at least a mile away from the
coastline and not visible from the air. Even "big" vessels are berthed in the interior.
Another reason for dry docking or berthing the vessels in the interior instead of letting them lie at sea is to
prevent corrosion. Incidentally even the berthed boats do not have heavy weapons on board. These are
kept safely elsewhere and mounted on the boat only when needed. A hallmark of the LTTE has been the
speed in which cadres and equipment is battle - ready. The heavy rains in December and flooding had
also compelled the LTTE to remove their vessels from the coast. This was so not only in Mullaitheevu but
in all other Eastern locations .
So when the tsunami hit the North - East on Sunday morning there were practically no tigers or vessels on
the coast. The few remaining near or on the sea were certainly affected but the losses are only a fraction
of the total strength. Moreover it was the day after Christmas and also a Sunday so all normal LTTE
activity had been suspended. There was no usual training sessions for new recruits in the morning
consisting of runs along the beach and sailings on boats. Also many "Christian" tigers had gone home on
Christmas leave. Some of these tigers and tigresses had been affected in their "civilian" capacity when the
tsunami waves hit their homesteads. So very few tigers got affected in Mullaitheevu the naval stronghold
of the LTTE.
Besides the tsunami waves rolling in circles had hit certain areas more forcefully than others. The
"Karaithuraipattru" stretch between Nayaaru in the South to Maathalan in the north had been hit hard with
the waves rolling in to distances ranging from 200 metres to 800 metres and water seeping in up to 1800
metres. The areas between Vattuvaagal and Theerthakarai had been particularly affected. Strange as it
may seem the Chalai - Chundikulam stretch had not been affected badly. Among areas suffering badly
were Mullaitheevu town, Kallapadu, Raalkuli, Manalkudiyiruppu, Selvapuram,
Koyilkudiyiruppu,Vannankulam, Silavathai, Theerthakarai, Uppumaaveli,karaichikudiyiruppu, Alambil
north, Semmalai, Naayaaru, Ambalanpokkanai, Maathalan, Mullivaikkal, Valaiyaarmadam and Vattuvaagal.
Kallapadu seems to have suffered the greatest loss of human life.
Apart from Mullaitheevu district coast the coastal stretch along Vadamaratchy east and Pachilaippalli on
the Jaffna peninsula too was severely hit. Kudathanai, Amban, Manalkaadu, Maamunai, Naagarkovil,
Kudaarappu, Chembianpattru, Thalaiady, Maruthankerny, Uduthurai, Aaliyawalai, Vathirayan etc were
affected badly. The areas south of Nagarkovil are LTTE controlled. The tigers lost some cadres deployed
on the Nagarkovil front lines along the coast to tsunami waves. It is also said that a few new recruits going
to the coast to view the phenomenon of a roll back sea after the first wave were affected. So too were
some tigers on leave with their families Coastal areas like Point Pedro, Valvettithurai, Thondamanaru,
Kankesanthurai, Ponnalai, Karainagar, Mathagal, Ilavalai, Senthankulam, Keerimalai etc to experienced
huge waves but not to the terrible extent elsewhere.
The tigers seem to have lost a few cadres in Trincomalee along the Verugal mugathuvaaram camp. The
Vaaharai, Kathiravely, Paalsenai sea tiger camps in Batticaloa district suffered no losses because they
were dysfunctional after the Karuna rebellion. The Eastern sea tigers were operating from Trincomalee
district going to the Batticaloa coast only during day. No boats or personnel were stationed in Batticaloa
because of fear of Karuna cadres attacking from the Maankerny, Panichankerny , Kalkudah army camps.
A few on Naasivantheevu were affected.
LTTE political wing chief SP Thamilchelvan with his flair for uttering falsehoods through smiling teeth has
stated that tiger losses due to tsunami were fifteen. Though the casualty toll was higher than 15 it does
not seem to have reached three digits. 142 of 167 orphan children housed at the LTTE run orphanage
"Senthalir Illam" at Mullaitheevu were killed. They were not cadres. Some tigers are reportedly missing and
it is very likely that the LTTE may release an official figure of losses after the missing are finally accounted
for.
One story doing the rounds in Tamil circles is that a detachment of new recruits undergoing training had
been swept away. According to this version these kids had been on the beach after the first wave looking
at the receding sea and were hit when the sea stormed in. Technically they are not tigers because their
training is not over. It is said that the LTTE is not admitting to their loss because they were not full -
fledged tigers. Even if this tale is true those killed were only about 40 to 50 it is said.
Another rumour circulating in Colombo and abroad is about LTTE leader Velupillai Pirapakaran, According
to this version the tiger leader known for his secular outlook had gone to attend a special Christmas mass
in Mullaitheevu and fell victim. Tiger circles vehemently deny this. Tiger opponents however point to
Pirapakaran's "absence" from relief efforts and in contrast the highly visible presence of Soosai in support
of their theory. The reality is that Pirapakaran has never been known to visit disaster -prone areas in the
past or pose for cameras like populist politicians in the past. Even if the LTTE leader was affected there is
no doubt that he is very much alive and active.
The LTTE has buried about 20 plus bodies so far at the great heroes cemetery at Mulliyawalai. The high
ranking tiger to be killed by tsunami was major Tharmendra promoted posthumously to Lt. Col. A strong
civilian supporter in charge of tiger fuel dumps known as "Petrol Aiyah" was also killed.
It may be noted that despite the very strong security force presence along the coast from Mathagal in the
north to Kirinde in the South their losses too have been comparatively small in numbers. 62 soldiers
including four officers were killed, six are missing and 248 injured. 15 navy men including two officers were
killed. 60 are injured and 87 missing. 15 policemen are dead. 8 are injured and two missing. The air force
has not sustained any loss. The LTTE figure for injured persons is not known.
In terms of damages the tigers have lost four of their observation posts along the coast including radar
equipment. 8 to 10 boats including four trainer boats were lost. About 15 small fibreglass boats were
recovered later by the sea tigers. Sea tiger structures along the North - Eastern coasts have been
damaged. An arms and ammunition dump was extensively damaged. The most serious loss seems to be
the secretly constructed new amphibian facility at Karaichikudiyiruppu. Rumour has it that a few sea
planes, hovercrafts and undersea mini - submarines etc were housed there at the time of tsunami. Major
Dharmendra apparently was in charge there.
The relief and rehabilitation work in Mullaitheevu is being spearheaded by Sea tiger special commander
Thillaiambalam Sivanesan alias Col. Soosai. He is being assisted by sea tiger cadre. The highly visible
morale of Soosai and the sea tigers does not seem indicative of a force that has taken a severe battering
or lost their leader unless of course all these tigers including Soosai are first class actors. The speedy and
efficient manner in which tiger cadres are doing relief work has made LTTE stock go high not only with the
Tamils but also observers from the international community.
Whatever the LTTE's faults it has always been regarded as being efficient. Ruthlessly efficient one may
say. That efficiency came into prominence after the disaster. The tiger cadres without proper equipment
have done a commendable job in providing help and relief to victims. They have cleared debris and
commenced clean up campaigns. Recovered bodies have been disposed after being photographed and
available details recorded. Health precautions too were taken. Several Western Journalists have
complimented the LTTE on this.
The tigers began similar efforts in Government controlled areas of the North - East too. This earned them
much praise in the East among Muslims and Tamil circles supportive of rebel leader Karuna too. Several
Tamils have gone on record to the international media persons that it was the LTTE and Tamil
organizations that came to their aid in the first three or days after the tsunami disaster. Fearing perhaps
this upsurge in tiger popularity President Kumaratunga has handed over relief work responsibility to the
armed forces.
At the same time various reports in sections of the media about tiger "offences" are disturbing. The LTTE
is accused of acts like obstructing relief efforts, seizing relief supplies, abducting minors and preventing
non - tiger Tamils free movement etc. The LTTE has reacted strongly to this. Sadly the track record of the
LTTE is so low that except for Tamil supporters others tend to believe these assertions. Two opposing
trends seem visible. On the one hand anti - tiger circles are deliberately promoting a smear campaign
against the LTTE. On the other pro - tiger circles are systematically fostering an anti - Government
campaign. The politics of tsunami!
The tsunami crisis has also helped the LTTE to galvanize the Tamil expatriates into supporting its
rehabilitation efforts. People abroad are donating enormous amounts of money in a highly emotional
state. The tiger media is projecting a viewpoint that the "Sinhala" state is obstructing and neglecting
rehabilitation of Tamil areas and that the Tamil people have no choice other than to rally behind the
tigers. Tamil solidarity is essential. The virtual black out of happenings in the Tamil areas during the early
days after the tragedy contributed greatly to this collective Tamil feeling. Some are reminded of the post -
July 1983 state of mind.
A campaign is afoot to accuse Colombo of neglecting Tamil areas. This is hotly denied. While Tamilselvan
says that no food was sent to their areas Colombo has released figures that more food has been sent to
the North than the South. More importantly the Sinhala people spontaneously came to the aid of their
Tamil and Muslim brethren. Nevertheless an anti - government resentment as opposed to a pro - Sinhala
people sentiment is growing among the Tamil people.
Kumaratunga's ill - advised decision to give the security forces full control over relief work as opposed to
civilian authority can only increase Tamil alienation and support for the LTTE. Attempts to prevent Kofi
Annan from visiting affected Tamil areas has angered Tamils to a great extent. The "Sinhala" state seems
to be playing politics even in the aftermath of a massive tragedy it is felt. Even if Annan Could not go to a
tiger area why could he not have visited a Tamil affected area in the North - East is the troubling question.
While not underestimating the efforts of majoritarian racism to undermine the tigers the LTTE must also
realise that however great the Tsunami tragedy the plight of the pathetic Tamil people cannot cast
"respectability" to the organization overnight. Trying to monopolise the North - Eastern relief effort and
claiming a separate status at this point of time could be counterproductive. The LTTE will do well to
cooperate as far as possible with Colombo in a "strategic Partnership" in Tsunami rehabilitation work.
This is the best way to maximise international aid for the Tamil areas and in the process refurbish the
LTTE image. Premature attempts to strike out alone will not succeed.
The Sri Lankan government's approach and views projected in the official media like the SLBC
announcement about the "demise" of Pirapakaran and Pottu Amman are troubling to say the least. If the
feeling that the LTTE has been weakened after Tsunami gathers strength in Colombo the beating of war
drums are certain to follow. This can cause war again because the LTTE is not weakened as projected by
the hardliners.
There is no doubt that the LTTE has sustained losses and damage due to tsunami waves. The loss
however is nowhere near the extent as projected by sections of the media, anti - tiger websites or
President Kumaratunga. The sea tigers have retained the bulk of their military assets including men,
material and marine vessels. The damage incurred to infra - structure can be repaired. Losses can be
restored and arsenals replenished. LTTE sea tiger manpower and marine mobility remains unaffected.
Tsunami or no tsunami the "Kadalpuligal" (Sea tigers) will ride the waves again.
The possibility of war has receded not because the sea tigers have taken a battering but due to the tragic
climate created by tsunami waves. The Tamil people of the North - Eastern coast are badly hit. 90 %
percent of the victims are coastal fisher folk. Due to various reasons this segment has been the power
base of the LTTE. Also the tragedy with its international attention has created widespread sympathy. The
need of the hour is peace and relief not war and havoc. The LTTE is mindful of this. The tigers will also
use this opportunity to gain recognition and credibility among the Tamils and the International community
by spearheading the relief and rehabilitation efforts in the North - East..The tigers unless due to an
absolutely compelling reason will not resort to war in the near future. This is due to political concerns
rather than military weakness.
Neither the Tamil people nor the International Community will forgive the tigers if they resume war
unilaterally. The tigers know this. Thus Pirapakaran says that "we will not fire the first shot". The LTTE
however will not hesitate to retaliate if Colombo goes on the offensive. Misleading reports that the sea
tigers are wiped out could tempt Colombo to pursue the military option even after this Tsunami tragedy. A
close look at the Indonesia - Aceh problem even after Tsunami will show that a recurrence of war is not an
impossibility.
Meanwhile President Kumaratunga will do well to disregard the misinformation being dished out to her
about a sea tiger debacle and focus on engaging the LTTE in peace talks. The tsunami waves with all the
destruction caused have helped compel the LTTE put their intended course of action on hold. This
respite should be adroitly utilised by the President to reinforce the shaky peace process rather than
fantasize on the demise of the sea tigers.
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