JVP conditions and peacemaking
By Austin Fernando
Sri Lankans have been debating over peace for more than two decades. By the time
President Kumaratunga took charge of the peace process in 2004, several general
agreements had been reached. They were: (a) Commitment to carry out a negotiating
process. (b) Changing the "unitary" concept of State to "united". (c) Acceptance of
Federalism and (d) Agreement for power sharing.
Consensus on peace
Similarly, the operational outputs for which consensus had been reached were the
following: (a) The CFA, as an instrument of peace though with some weaknesses. (b)
Special working arrangements developed between the parties, military authorities with
Monitor’s interventions. (c) Norwegians considered as the Facilitator. (d) Monitoring of
the CFA done by a Nordic Mission (e) Conducting six sessions of peace talks.(f)
International support for reconstruction and rehabilitation to the tune of US $ 4.5 billion
and developing an "international safety net".(g) A proposed organizational
arrangement (ISGA) for development of the north and east submitted by the LTTE.
These seven were all positive developments in the face of several untoward incidents,
including the many violations of the CFA. The government, civil society, international
organizations, media and public were aware of these blatant violations. No one will
ever justify or condone the perpetrators of violations. However, these two major
political parties --especially the UNP-- did not street demonstrate, indirectly calling for
war, like the smaller parties. Some PA supporters did so by participating at such
demonstrations with the JVP / JHU.
Opponents of consensus reached
The JVP and the JHU, individuals and organizations who did not appreciate these
positive outputs always criticized the CFA and the peace process, on the grounds of
"selling the country to the LTTE," and "separation of the country" etc. The JVP and the
JHU were the most boisterous and cantankerous. They assumed very correctly that
the parties who would be the alternate government cannot do so openly, as they
expect to negotiate peace one day, and any wild criticism may jeopardize future
negotiations. The JVP and the JHU were far away from this real life situation of
governing.
By whipping up such emotional sentiments they have created and beguiled a hate
campaign against the Tamils (though they sheepishly do not admit it) and this affects
any future solution. The emotionally and politically divided electorate falls in to their
hands irrespective of the damage caused to the social fabric. It is made acute when
educated and leading personalities such as priests, professionals such as lawyers,
retired administrators, business magnates, university dons etc. speak out emotionally
and unrealistically. The dangerous repercussion is that all such behavior shortens and
thins down space for negotiations, distancing the dawn of peace.
JVP's plans
As for the JVP having a beggar's wound was essential, as positive and quick economic
development could be negated by war. Crises make it possible for them to be the
spokespersons for the "suffering masses" and Good Samaritans in the long run. When
the two major parties fail in making peace, the demand for a third force to emerge will
become acute and unrestrained. They expect that the frustrated electorate may jump
in to their hands. The interest is to fill the void in political activation. The problem for
them was that this would be a long march when two major parties are in the political
domain. Therefore, liquidating one was essential and JVP / JHU knew that sneaking in
to UNP was difficult due to the firm and mature stances they took on the national
problem.
Therefore, their hidden agenda could succeed only by splitting the "softer target“ the
SLFP. This was well planned and executed by the JVP by being supportive of the PM
in the candidacy for the presidency. To make it happen, the JVP hijacked the JHU
proposals, jumped the gun and signed an agreement with the PM, well knowing that
the President would oppose, as the conditions would be negating all policies and
stances taken on peace by her individually and the SLFP, over time.
Unfortunate relationships
The differences of opinions between the President and the PM were well known and
when the President got rid of the JVP from the UPFA government, the JVP's hope for
the Presidency was the PM, whom the JVP considered unfit to be even the Premier in
April 2004. Persons, parties etc. etc. are immaterial for political strategizing and
manipulating, and the trap was laid and the unsuspecting PM who was willing to accept
any support agreed to the conditions laid by the JVP/JHU. One cannot blame him for
coalescing, as he could not think of victory without a solid southern support (inclusive
of Horagolla!) and on the face of weak minority support. The issue here is how correct,
ethical and politically viable is the way he moved in this matter.
JVP conditions and peace
Let us look at the conditions that were proposed to the PM to gauge how the peace
process could be jeopardized by implementing these conditions.
Firstly, the P-TOMS drafted with peace motives was signed by President's
representative even as the PM kept mum. On the grounds of collective responsibility
and ethics of governance, he should have broken his silence. He should have
defended the President when she was bashed by the JVP and the JHU. P-TOMS was
approved by the SLFP Central Committee, Cabinet and tabled in the Parliament and
the PM signing an agreement negating it with a party that opposed the P-TOMS
should necessarily offend the President, because her peace motives are shattered.
As the Central Committee and Cabinet gave approval for P-TOMS, the President
considering that withdrawing from P-TOMS is equivalent to withdrawing from SLFP and
Cabinet is logical. Further, she must be questioning the PM's authority to overrule her,
especially as P-TOMS was a peace initiative.
The second issue in the JVP set of conditions is regards peace negotiations. As
expected by the JVP and the PM, if all parties are brought to negotiations, it is well and
good. The UNP and SLFP, when in office, failed to even bring the alternate major
political party to their negotiating processes. In addition, the LTTE rightly or wrongly
will never agree to this proposition. This is the political and operational truth and
reality. Nevertheless, the JVP may be trying to reverse the process through the PM.
This reversal will ultimately bring back war.
Thirdly, preserving the unitary nature of the Constitution is history for the SLFP and
the UNP. President Kumaratunga submitted a draft constitution to the Parliament in
2000 having moved towards the "united state" concept and federalism. PM Rajapakse,
as a Minister in the PA nodded assent for a "united state" and "federalism". Suddenly,
as a presidential candidate, he gives up the "united state" / "federalism" and heartily
cheers the JVP/JHU and becomes a "unitarist". The PM’s inconsistent nature is
questioned, especially in the background of Ranil Wickremesinghe being steadfastly
firm on this issue, which was commended even by the JHU. Is not the PM inadvertently
or deliberately pushing the country to conflict?
Fourthly, to completely redo the CFA is one of the conditions. The national security
aspects of the CFA are considered the reason for this demand. Redoing the CFA may
be necessary due to certain inherent weaknesses. Article 4.3 of the CFA provides for
"amendments and modifications by mutual agreement." The "amendments
/modifications" demanded by the JVP and JHU are clear. How is it if the LTTE requires
the CFA to be amended or modified to suit their conveniences too, such as giving up
high security zones, free movement in sea etc., which will be very dangerous? Without
agreeing to the LTTE demands, it may not be practical to expect the LTTE to agree to
amendments or modifications to suit only the JVP/JHU. The CFA is an instrument of
mutual consent. When the PM fails to redo the CFA, what is the remedy other than
war?
Fifthly, slashing the role of Norway as Facilitator is another condition. The comedy is
that the PM wants to review Norway's role; the JVP and the JHU want Norway out; and,
Jayantha Dhanapala recently reassured in New York that Norway will continue. The
President too is supportive of Norwegians. What mixed signals go out? Norway was
brought to the peace scenario by the President with agreement by the LTTE, UNF and
the world community. Is it realistic or even possible to chase Norway with one stroke of
a pen?
We learnt the bitter lesson of war when the Indian IPKF was chased away similarly on
JVP and LTTE demands. What if the LTTE disagrees with the proposed alternative
Facilitator? Is the PM willing to convince Prabhakaran with military might or dilute the
condition eating humble pie?
Direct talks with LTTE may be the more practical alternative proposal. With the LTTE
this will not work. They negotiate only to convey what the leadership wishes.
Therefore, it is better to have an intermediary facilitation, to deal with a difficult leader-
Norway or otherwise.
One cannot handle the peace process as a novice.
Political jamming
The JVP's plan worked. Now if the Prime Minister fails, the JVP will still gain, as one
split group- the pro-PM section- will have joined another party. It will not be the UNP,
but the JVP. If the Prime Minister wins the presidency, then the JVP will control him and
the anti PM group in the SLFP will either join the UNP or will go solo. For the JVP,
whatever the result it will be a win-win situation. Therefore, they succeeded in making
a permanent split through their hard conditions and jeopardizing peacemaking.
How could the PM, as the President (if he wins) go to the Vanni with the above
conditions in his bag. He may not proceed beyond Omanthai! Can we expect
Prabhakaran to say that he goes with the majority decision of the south? In reality, no.
What doe that mean? It means one thing- WAR.
This is real political jamming. There will be no winners in the short-term, other than the
JVP, who will gather the major portion of SLFP breakaways. Perhaps, the UNP too may
get a few. The JHU may not be a leading winner due to low organizational strength. In
the midterm every citizen will be a loser, as war will break out, if these conditions are
executed. If dissension continues, in the long-term, the only winners will be the arms
dealers and the LTTE. Therefore, consensus building on the peace exercise is
essential, for which there should be a better dialogue between the major parties and
minor ones, on a sensible note. If the problem could be nipped in the bud by dialogue
we may save this country from devastation on the grounds of ethnicity, race and
religion.
(The Writer is a former Defense Secretary)