By Keith Noyahr
President Chandrika Kumaratunga was deprived of basking in the glory of
securing the support of India for the Joint Mechanism, as she had to face the grim
reality that she could not have her way so easily.
It certainly was a happy weekend for a tired President. But her joy was short-lived
as the week began with the news of the fast-unto-death by the Jathika Hela
Urumaya senior monk Ven. Omalpe Sobitha Thera. The fast now on its fifth day
(Friday) will stand in the way of signing the mechanism.
The Thursday warning to the President by the four Mahanayake Theras will
certainly have Kumaratunga entertaining second thoughts. The President last
evening met the Mahanayakes at the Presidential Secretariat to try and explain to
them the contents of the JM. They appeared convinced.
It was later revealed that JHU leaders had expressed willingness to call off the
hunger strike if the Mahanayakes could convince them that there was no threat to
national security.
The headstrong person that she is, Kumaratunga would damn the Janatha Vimukthi
Peramuna (JVP), damn her own party loyalists and the chief opposition party, if it
was necessary, and have her way, if she felt she was doing the right thing. After all,
she was separately elected directly by the people and was answerable to no
politicians but the people.
But, that's in theory.
The President could not be seen responsible for the death of a monk. At all costs
this should be prevented.
Another monk aligned to the JVP was also threatening to stage a death fast.
The fallout of any monk taking his life is quite frightening.
In my previous columns, I had advised the President to go ahead and sign the
mechanism. She should have had it signed pronto after instructing officials to
finalise the agreement pending Indian approval. If India cleared it as it is, why did
President Kumaratunga delay in getting it signed? If India cleared it, it should have
been made public, pronto and signed immediately.
Even if India sought some amendments, it should have been obtained speedily
unless the LTTE was adamant.
Now, it appears too late. In the immediate interests of the country, it may not be all
that prudent for the President to sign it at this juncture.
The fate of the Joint Mechanism, now called the Post Tsunami Operational
Management Structure (P-TOMS) is in the balance at this moment of time.
Instead of helping resolve the peace process, the signing of the Joint Mechanism
could even cause a bloodbath worse than the previous one staged by the JVP after
the 1987 Indo-Lanka Peace Accord.
Eighteen years ago, the JVP was just an underground organization trying to
overthrow the government of the day. This time around the party, elected by the
people, in an alliance with the SLFP, has more than legal status. It is a partner in
government.
Given this status, naturally the JVP would have earned the respect of the police
and the armed forces with whom it earlier clashed. The President could not ride
roughshod over the JVP nor could the law enforcement agencies. This is only
possible if the JVP resorts to open violence. But, having earned the respect of the
security forces and the police as part of the ruling party, it would be difficult to see
these forces treating the JVP shabbily, as it did in the late eighties.
What we are witnessing in Trincomalee is limited support by the security forces.
How could the trishaw drivers place such a huge statue of the Buddha without the
services of a crane?
A senior and seasoned Indian diplomat in Colombo last week quite rightly observed
that the incidents in Trincomalee are actually helping the extremist parties - the
LTTE and the JVP. He named them. He was dead right.
It appears that for the Indian High Commission in Colombo, it is delivery time. This
week, Indian First Secretary (Political) Amandeep Singh Gill's wife delivered a baby
at the Apollo Hospital. In a couple of weeks or so the First Secretary (Information
and Culture) Nagma Malik will herself be a happy mother for the second time.
By extension, we would like to see our friendly neighbour India help deliver Sri
Lanka out of its present and serious troubles.
Given India's proximity to the JVP over the past several years and the fact that JVP
Leader Somawansa Amerasinghe was accorded safe sanctuary in India after the
first insurrection in the late eighties, India could prevail upon the party to soften its
stance towards the ethnic conflict. India, with a 50 million Tamil population across
the Palk Strait will not want this problem to fester for too long, to an irreversible
point. The majority of the Sinhala people have shown at successive elections that
they are for a political solution to the ethnic conflict.
As our sister paper The Sunday Times, quoting a senior Asian diplomat in its main
political column rightly said last week, "India has taken the appropriate stand -
expressed its understanding of what is going on and support for it."
The same diplomat had pointed out that "a complete rejection would only give the
LTTE a handle to accuse New Delhi and run to the international community with
charges of sabotaging the peace process."
India by supporting the Joint Mechanism is cleared of charges of sabotaging the
peace process.
But, to use the same argument, this will not stop the LTTE from running to the
international community with charges of the South sabotaging the peace process.
The LTTE will repeat its claim that the nationalist JVP and the Buddhist clergy have
sabotaged the legally sustainable joint mechanism that is seen by many as a
possible basis for resuming peace talks, to find a political solution. The fact that this
is nothing compared to the ISGA which the LTTE wanted as the only basis to
resume talks has been lost.
The LTTE's message to the international community will be: The nationalist parties,
the Buddhist clergy and the chief opposition party are doing exactly what they have
been doing since independence. The Banda-Chelva Pact, the Dudley-Chelva Pact,
the Indo-Lanka Accord, to name a few agreements.
There are other reasons why India must drive sense into the ruling coalition.
The international community is aware that the UNF which had made some headway
with regard to the peace process was dismissed midway. This government has a
moral duty then to find a solution to the ethnic conflict and the President cannot
simply dissolve Parliament without showing progress in the peace process.
Before the next general election is called, President Kumaratunga, her SLFP and
the JVP have a duty by the people to ensure that the country is on a better
economic footing than when Parliament was last dissolved, arbitrarily.
The President and the two parties, which formed the United People's Freedom
Alliance (UPFA), should also make sure that the country is not dragged into war by
their acts of commission and omission.
The country that has been bled for two long decades cannot afford another war,
however inviting and tempting it might appear after the Karuna faction broke away.
The act of dissolution in February, 2004, though legally valid, amounted to an
overthrow of the people's will. The usurping of key ministries three months ahead,
in November 2003, was based on the premise that there was a national security
threat, mainly in Trincomalee.
Honestly, the security threat in Trincomalee today, some 20 months after the
Defence Ministry was vested control of, is much greater. The actions of a group of
people clearly poised to provoke the ethnic communities there, is slowly leading to
an outbreak of hostilities. The situation in Batticaloa is no better, with the LTTE and
the Karuna faction having a free-for-all.
If India fails to get the JVP on board, perhaps it should at least try to get the two
main parties together. It is clear that the UNP too was not forthcoming in its support
for the President. The ostensible reason for the UNP's failure to support her is that
the copy of the mechanism was not shown to the party. The JVP too came up with
the same charge but with the rider that there could be no joint agreement with the
LTTE as it would give legitimacy to the organization.
India took the same line during the UNP peace process and refused to send a
delegation to the Oslo donor conference as the LTTE attended it. India however
made it to the Washington Preparatory Meeting in mid April 2003 as the LTTE was
left out.
A colleague of mine at the Daily Mirror this week was trying to make out that India,
during the recent visit of President Kumaratunga, has not said much about the Joint
Mechanism in the communique.
He kept on insisting that the joint mechanism was limited to a solitary line in a long
joint communique between the Indian Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh and the
Sri Lankan President Chandrika Kumaratunga.
What is important here is not even the whole line but the key phrase "support for
these ongoing efforts" obviously referring to the joint mechanism.
The words, "support for" is more than an endorsement by India and that is exactly
what President Kumaratunga sought when she made a beeline to India last week.
Obviously, at this stage she is not so interested in other issues mentioned in the
communique.
All she has sought for during the past three weeks or more was India's consent,
and it must be said she got it with conditions.
Days before the LTTE came up with its Interim Self Governing Authority (ISGA)
proposals, a lengthy joint statement between the leaders of the two countries had
devoted only a couple of lines on the subject.
"India expects that the response to the proposals made by the Sri Lankan
Government in July 2003 will be reasonable and comprehensive…. Any interim
arrangement should be an integral part of the final settlement."
Clearly, the joint statement on October 21, 10 days before the ISGA was unveiled,
was meant to influence the LTTE in its document.
What matters in these diplomatic joint statements is not the length of the statement
but the sting that is often buried somewhere, possibly in the tail. I said it at least
twice before, that India, by not committing itself during the long public debate on the
joint mechanism, had left its options open and was likely to give its clearance. She
did it.
Even if the joint mechanism does not materialize soon, New Delhi must not let this
conflict in its backyard fester for too long as it could have serious repercussions.
Visiting Indian Foreign Minister Natwar Singh must carry this message back to India,
today. The idea of a defence cooperation agreement, first mooted in the October
2003 joint comunique envisaged finality as soon as possible. Less than a fortnight
later the then UNF government lost its Defence Ministry.
The new government of India almost ruled out such a defence agreement, as Prime
Minister Manmohan Singh was forced to make such an assurance to a Southern
party in the ruling coalition. Last week when President Kumaratunga was on an
official visit, India offered to help Sri Lanka in its air-defence owing to the LTTE
threat given its air capability. The visiting Foreign Minister has again revisited the
subject of a possible Defence Cooperation Agreement and spoke of training to
local policemen. So, it appears that like Sri Lanka, India too is forced to vacillate for
political survival. But, in the final analysis, it is the strategic interests that will be the
key factor.
COURTESY:DAILY MIRROR
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