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A former Indian army official who served in Jaffna during the Indian Peace Keeping
Force fiasco of 1987 - 1990 has issued warnings about Liberation Tigers of Tamil
Eelam air power. Col. R. Hariharan who served in Jaffna during the IPKF period as
chief of military intelligence is now retired. Hariharan however is fast building a
reputation nowadays as a military affairs analyst by writing reserach articles and
making presentations at academic seminars. Writing in "The HINDU" of May 19th
2005 Col. R. Hariharan expresses worry and concern over the nascent air capability
of the tigers.
SINCE THE end of last year, the Sri Lankan media have reported off and on about
the newly acquired air capability of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. In February
2005, a press report said President Chandrika Kumaratunga had even told the two
former American Presidents, George Bush Sr. and Bill Clinton, about this in the
course of her briefing on the tsunami disaster and relief work organised by her
Government.
The Sri Lanka Air Force Chief Air Marshal Donald Perera had briefed the President
on the LTTE's capability from information gained through surveillance by unmanned
aerial vehicles some time in November 2003. The surveillance revealed that the
Tamil militants had built an airstrip near Iranamadu tank in the Wanni area and a light
aircraft was seen there. A number of reconnaissance missions are reported to have
shown a paved 1250-metre-long runway at the site and video footage of at least one
light aircraft landing at the airstrip. One more light aircraft was probably based there.
Air Marshal Perera had said the two planes spotted on the new airstrip were similar
to the Czech-built Zlin Z-143. He also said the Tigers were training their own pilots
and were well on the way to establishing a full-fledged air force.
The runway length indicates a capability to operate medium-sized aircraft such as
Dorniers with ease. Dorniers used by Indian security forces have the capability to lift
one section of commando troops (12 to 14 persons) with their load or about 1.2
tonnes of cargo. Basically, the LTTE gaining air capability will mean loss of the
Government's sovereign control of Sri Lankan airspace.
Apart from this, it provides the LTTE capability to strike at a place of its choosing
without telegraphing its intentions. Thus even with limited air capability, a commando
raid of the type carried out by the LTTE at the Katunayake airport becomes much
easier to execute. A light aircraft can evade radar surveillance because of its
minuscule signature and low flying capability. Some of the more deadly uses of a
light aircraft should be causing sleepless nights to those in charge of security at
Temple Trees, the official residence of the Sri Lankan President. Even in the U.S.,
where the airspace above the White House is well sanitised, on more than one
occasion light aircraft have penetrated the safety systems.
Deadly uses of light aircraft
Apart from the extreme use of an aircraft for a suicide attack as was done during
9/11, even light aircraft give LTTE a number of added operational capabilities.
Airborne commando missions both on land and at sea, ability to fly in arms and
supplies from abroad, surveillance of naval ships and troops, airborne direction of
artillery fire, evacuation of casualties, and spiriting away leaders at short notice are
some of these.
The LTTE appears to have built the airstrip between mid 2003 and end 2004. In this
period, the LTTE was vociferously demanding the resumption of the peace process.
This is so typical of the LTTE, which has refined the art of doublespeak springing
strategic operational surprises even while involved in a peace process.
Technology as a force multiplier: At all times, whether peace or war, the LTTE has
been on a quest to acquire new military technology. This process helps it in three
ways — it keeps up the morale of the fighters, opens up new areas and methods of
operation, and achieves tactical and strategic surprise upsetting the enemy. It also
becomes a good bargaining ploy when trade-offs are required in a peace settlement.
The LTTE has always had ambitions of air power. Even during the Indian Peace
Keeping Force (IPKF) operations in 1988, we had recovered assembly parts of micro
light aircraft from LTTE hideouts along with plans with manuals. Subsequently, during
its operations Sri Lanka forces had also found an LTTE engineering workshop with
aircraft spares. In late 1988, the LTTE acquired surface-to-air missiles, which were
used effectively in the later years against the Sri Lankan air force. Since then it has
moved on to augment its artillery, radar systems, and naval capability. So acquiring
air capability was a logical sequence in LTTE's vision for creating a full-fledged
armed force.
Vision of Tamil Eelam: Undoubtedly, the LTTE acquiring air capability improves its
image as the world's best organised insurgent force. It also shows that the LTTE is
giving form and content to its vision of land, air and sea operational freedom. The
fact that the LTTE had invested precious resources of time, energy and money to
acquire the air capability indicates that it would continue with the process of technical
refinement and technology acquisition to improve its fighting capability despite the
ongoing peace process. In short, the LTTE as a fighting force will continue, whether
in the end the Tamil Eelam that comes out as an entity is within a federal set-up or
otherwise. So much for LTTE leader Velupillai Prabakaran's much heralded
readiness to accept a solution within the federal framework!
Ability to beat the U.S. sanctions: The LTTE has shown that despite U.S. and
European Union sanctions, it has the ability to internationally muster large scale
financial and technical resources required for its projects and move them to Sri
Lanka clandestinely. This is not a happy situation for Sri Lanka or India, the
immediate neighbour.
The LTTE's record shows that it used every peace pause to acquire more weapons.
After the current peace process began, by the first half of 2004 the LTTE had
received 11 shiploads of arms. The fact that the LTTE has flouted the spirit of the
peace process with total impunity to strengthen its ability to wage war should be a
matter of concern for international community. It also highlights the ineffectiveness of
the present terms of operation of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission, a toothless entity
with its capability limited to issuing watered-down statements.
The lack of unity among Sri Lankan political parties on the question of talks with the
LTTE is delaying the resumption of the peace dialogue. The LTTE has put this delay
to good use by augmenting its strike capability. Thus when the peace process is
resumed Colombo's negotiators will face a stronger LTTE in a better bargaining
position.
The LTTE's single airstrip and a few light aircraft may not be a major threat to Indian
security in the conventional sense. However, India should take a hard look at it at two
levels — vis-à-vis its Sri Lanka policy options and the security measures against the
LTTE's offensive terrorist capability, which has been augmented.
The LTTE has emerged as a more ruthless and much better organised killing
machine since the IPKF days. So the validity of foreign policy dispensations of IPKF
vintage needs a fresh scrutiny. When the Sea Tigers came into being as a naval
force, the Government of India blissfully ignored it despite it becoming a third naval
force that could intrude into the waters of India and Sri Lanka without any legitimacy
whatsoever. This perhaps enabled the LTTE to get it legitimised in the eyes of the
Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission, which had tried to equate it with the Sri Lankan Navy.
Viewed in this context, it was disappointing to note External Affairs Minister Natwar
Singh's bland statement, "We are concerned about the LTTE having built an airstrip
and having two aeroplanes and there's news about more coming," in the course of
his recent interview ( The Hindu , May 7). However, Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran,
at his meeting with Erik Solheim, the Norwegian peace envoy, in New Delhi on May
11, is reported to have stated that India was "bitterly opposed to LTTE dictatorship."
It is time the Government of India came out with a detailed and unambiguous
statement on the various aspects of the Sri Lankan issue including on the LTTE, the
Tamils right to be their own masters in a federal Sri Lanka, and the peace process.
Otherwise, the LTTE would only be encouraged to strengthen its armed capability
much to the detriment of peace in this part of the subcontinent.
As regards the security aspects, proactively we need to initiate security measures
taking into consideration the LTTE's augmented capability to launch and carry out
commando operations using its air capability. Those who consider this alarmist would
do well to remember the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi, plotted and executed with
precision by the very same organisation after Indian troops pulled out of Sri Lanka.
Precautionary measures could include tightening surveillance of less used airstrips,
deploying intelligence assets for gathering specific information on procurement of
aircraft spares, aviation fuel, and training of LTTE pilots in Tamil Nadu and adjoining
States. Of course, India should also maintain a continuous surveillance of the
activities at the airstrip.