Looking back on the 4th anniversary of the CFA...
published on March 10, 2002..
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False alarm over the ceasefire that backfired
'Kettikkaariyin poyyum purattum , Ettu naaliley purinthu
pogum; Ammammaaival oru poippiravi; Appappappaa Ival
oru puthuppiravi.'
(The clever woman's lies and twists will be understood in
eight days: Oh Mother, this woman is a false being: Oh
Father, this woman is a new being.)
- Chorus of an old Tamil film song from the MGR movie
Kannan En Kaathalan
By D. B. S. Jeyaraj
Her Excellency, Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga,
executive president of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri
Lanka, is at her alarmist activities again. The first lady has
been firing salvo after salvo against Ranil Wickremesinghe,
the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and Norway at
meetings for ushering in peace for domestic consumption.
Realisation dawns when the international community seeks
explanations from the former angel of peace about these
pro-war, anti-peace sentiments. Then come the denials,
retractions, clarifications etc. through Balapatabendi and
Harim Peiris.
In a sense there is nothing new in this approach. This is what
Kumaratunga was indulging in for several years until
Wickremesinghe became the legal occupant of Temple Trees.
Her so called war for peace was a classic example of this
exercise in duplicity. War on an unprecedented, massive scale
was unleashed on the Tamil people while the international
donor community was lulled into complacency and complicity
through assertions of a peaceful settlement.
Failing miserably
This double game of cooing like a peace dove internationally
and screeching as a battle hawk nationally got exposed badly
after Norway entered the picture as facilitator.
Initially, Kumaratunga and former Foreign Minister Lakshman
Kadirgamar may have entertained hopes of depicting and
isolating the Tigers as being opposed to a peaceful
settlement. The independence and integrity of the Norwegians
particularly the former special envoy for peace Erik Solheim
prevented the manipulation Colombo desired. Kumaratunga
also failed to comprehend the new approach of the LTTE
towards negotiations. Whatever the ultimate conclusion there
was no doubt that for reasons of its own the LTTE was firmly
committed to the peace process.
Thus, Kumaratunga failed miserably on all three counts. She
could not defeat the LTTE militarily and appease the Sinhala
hardliners. Instead, it was her armed forces who were on the
brink of defeat and rescued indirectly through international
intervention. Politically she could not push her diluted
constitutional package through. At the same time the LTTE
was from being isolated politically had become an accepted as
the representative of the Tamils. The 'Pongu Thamil Eluchchi'
(Tamil Upsurge) demonstrations along with the four party
Tamil alliance mandate demonstrated clearly that due to a
variety of reasons the LTTE was now accepted as the premier
politico-military force of the Tamils.
Diplomatically her double standards towards a negotiated
settlement and wilful obstruction became transparent. The
United National Front (UNF) government pulled off a ceasefire
in two months whereas the People's Alliance (PA) could not
succeed for more than two years.
What is now happening is that Kumaratunga instead of
learning new lessons from her mistakes is repeating the failed
past again. The false alarms raised in public and party
meetings about the ceasefire and ceasefire agreement are
calculated to encourage domestic instability and undermine
the peace process.
Blowing hot and cold
The press releases are aimed at the international community
that is firmly backing this peace process. She is most probably
smirking in a smug, self-congratulatory mode about how smart
she is. Sadly, this smug self-satisfaction is unwarranted as Sri
Lanka in particular and the world in general are becoming
'wiser and wiser' about the fallen peace angel. Each time she
opens her mouth to 'blow hot and cold' her credibility
diminishes. She herself is setting the stage for her anticipated
exit from Presidential office through her ill advised
pronouncements.
Kumaratunga however overplayed her hand when she came
out with an open letter to Wickremesinghe about her
'concerns' over the ceasefire agreement. The woman was now
firmly bound by a document in writing. Her intended audience
for the letter made public was of course the majority
community. The idea was to raise doubts in the country
through unfounded allegations and inaccurate assertions
about the ceasefire. But the double edged sabre has drawn
blood of her own. The eleven page letter stands as firm proof
of Kumaratunga's animosity and rancour towards peace in the
island.
Her overseas cheering squad is aghast and repelled. Too late
she tries to salvage the situation by getting her secretariat to
issue a statement that she is supportive of peace while being
dismissively concerned about the nuts and bolts of the
ceasefire agreement. Again she seems incapable of realising
that it is one thing to wriggle out of predicaments by outright
denials and entirely another matter to disown a written epistle.
Much of what Kumaratunga alleged in her letter have been
knocked down by Wickremesinghe in Parliament, G. L. Peiris
in a newspaper interview and Anton Balasingham in a press
statement. All three persons intimately involved in the run up
of events leading to the ceasefire have clarified the issues
raised and placed the matter in perspective.
Once again it is obvious that Kumaratunga had tried to
hoodwink the nation by raising a deliberate false alarm.
Furthermore, it does not require particular expertise to
discover Kumaratunga's deceptive manoeuvre. Anyone with
reasonable linguistic comprehension, familiarity with recent
political developments, large amounts of common sense and
above all possession of an unbiassed mind can examine the
documents concerned and arrive at the truth themselves.
Although the signature in the letter there is little room to doubt
that authorship was Kadirgamar's. Apart from the pompous
and hypocritic elements there are also the tell tale signs of
'personal trumpeting.' It is openly acknowledged that the letter
was preceded by a special study undertaken by a team of 20
experts under Kadirgamar who analysed the ceasefire
agreement. There is however no mention about the missive
being a direct consequence of that study or report. There are
also no details of whether the letter has relied on this study or
whether the letter was a solo effort by Kadirgamar. This is
indeed intriguing because many of those involved in the
analytical exercise are people hitherto possessing impeccable
credentials as intellectuals and proponents of peace. It seems
unlikely that people of such calibre could have ever
subscribed to some of the observations expressed in
Kumaratunga's letter.
Sabre rattling
It is also noteworthy that despite her sabre rattling neither
Kumaratunga nor the PA have sought legal remedy against
what she says is a flawed agreement violating the constitution.
Sinhala hardline parties like the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna
and Sihala Urumaya are rushing into areas where the former
peace angel fears to tread. Also despite pugilistic
pronouncements about the ceasefire's illegality Kumaratunga
has not dared to order her defence chiefs to flout it. The
reasons are not hard to seek. Kumaratunga knows that in the
present juncture she will only invite the wrath of the
international community against her on this count.
Impeachment would become a necessity. The remnants of her
pro-peace reputation would be shredded. More importantly
she also realises that in spite of her rhetoric to the contrary
there is every chance that the courts would not fault the
events leading to the ceasefire agreement.
So for now, her strategy would be to crouch before pouncing.
She will through intermittent statements undermine the peace
process on the one hand and assuage the international
community on the other. Kumaratunga and her minions will in
the days to come exploit every negative aspect of the
ceasefire. Any lapse or fault would be highlighted,
exaggerated and possibly distorted. Gradually, a climate of
mistrust against the ceasefire would be created through
propaganda. Finally, the magic date of December 5, 2002
would dawn. Kumaratunga would be constitutionally
empowered to strike. Pronto! Dissolution of Parliament on
grounds of ceasefire endangering national security. She came
out publicly last week that she will not dissolve Parliament
after a year although she is entitled to simply because the
UNF government will collapse on its own in two years.
Knowing Kumaratunga's brand of doublespeak it is crystal
clear therefore that she will definitely dissolve Parliament this
year unless she is impeached beforehand. Of course she is
always capable of acting prematurely on a rash impulse and
spoil her carefully laid out strategy.
Fait accompli
A piece of jocular advice given to young and eager legal
eaglets on the threshold of a promising career at the bar is
about the way they should argue their cases. 'If you are sure
of the law argue the law, if you are sure of the facts argue the
facts and if you are unsure of both then raise your voice and
bang the table'. The bellicose tone and remonstrative tenor of
Kumaratunga's letter reminds one of this quip.
Kumaratunga's primary grouse is about her being sidelined in
the process leading to the ceasefire agreement. She accuses
Wickremesinghe of having presented a fait accompli to her.
The essence of her complaint in this regard is that correct
procedure was not being followed in the process leading to
the ceasefire. The constitutionality or unconstitutionality of the
ceasefire agreement will be determined in another forum in
the days to come. What is important now is to see whether the
facts substantiate her charges.
Wickremesinghe and G. L. Peiris have made it clear that had
Kumaratunga attended the regular cabinet meeting on
Wednesday, February 20, she would have come to know of
the proposed ceasefire. It was therefore Kumaratunga's lack
of interest in the activity of 'her third government' that led to
her being unintentionally kept in the dark. Moreover,
Wickremesinghe has been unusually frank in admitting that
LTTE leader Velupillai Prabakharan had pleasantly surprised
him by signing the ceasefire agreement on his own and
presenting it as an accomplished fact to Norwegian envoy in
Colombo Jon Westborg when the latter helicoptered on the
21st to Kilinochchi.
Pre-emptive strike
As Wickremesinghe said openly the alacrity with which
Prabakharan signed the document left him no choice but to
follow suit accordingly. As such he was compelled to present a
document that had already been signed by the Tiger supremo
to Kumaratunga on 21st evening.
It does seem therefore that Prabakharan had engaged in a
pre-emptive strike when he signed the ceasefire as quickly as
was possible. This however is consistent with the LTTE stance
from the time it launched a peace offensive. Be it under
Kumaratunga or Wickremesinghe it was the LTTE that
declared a unilateral ceasefire first to force the pace of peace.
Prabakharan was only being consistent in this respect when
he took the lead again in signing the document. Another
factor however that may have influenced his decision could
have been Kumaratunga herself.
It is no secret to the LTTE that Kumaratunga was and is
against a negotiated peace with the Tigers notwithstanding
her protests to the contrary. The Tigers are only too aware of
the manner in which she undermined the earlier peace
process while paying lip service to it. Besides, Kumaratunga's
recent conduct also did not give much hope that her attitude
had altered on this issue. What was worse her credibility was
highly suspect of what had happened in early February. The
draft ceasefire agreement taken to Colombo by the Vikings
had been leaked to the media. The 'inspired' leaks of
controversial provisions were calculated to whip up
oppositional frenzy amid the Sinhala hardliners against the
exercise. The conclusion derived from this was that the leaks
came from Kumaratunga's side.
It was in this context that Kumaratunga was not briefed
thereafter of any other developments on this issue until some
success had been achieved. The final draft of the ceasefire
was approved and accepted by the LTTE only on Tuesday
(19). It was only after that Wickremesinghe briefed cabinet on
Wednesday (20). Kumaratunga being absent from the cabinet
meeting was not expected. So, had she attended the meeting
the chances are that Kumaratunga would have come to know
of the ceasefire being finalised.
Now Wickremesinghe may be labouring under illusions about
cohabitation and bipartisan cooperation with Kumaratunga but
the Tigers have a different assessment of her. They were of
the view at one stage last year that no progress of the peace
process was possible with the Kumaratunga-Kadirgamar duo
and acted accordingly. It is very likely then that the Tigers
could have suspected Kumaratunga of sabotaging the
ceasefire even at that penultimate level and gone ahead with
the 'unilateral' move to prevent her from disrupting it again.
Exposure disrupted
When Kumaratunga complains about the executive president
who is head of 'state, government and armed forces' not
being informed about the final stages of the ceasefire it would
appear that she has a genuine grievance and that
constitutional norms have been flouted. But that is only the
appearance. The reality however is that in an unprecedented
development the participants in the peace process felt that
the president should know about the ceasefire only when it
was imminent. Premature exposure would have disrupted it.
The primary reason for this approach was the track record of
Kumaratunga and the utter mistrust in which she was held.
With the wisdom of hindsight it may be said that the ceasefire
agreement saw the light of day only because Kumaratunga
was kept in the dark. If she had not been presented a fait
accompli the chances are that she would have wrecked it.
What is truly of concern therefore is not the fact that the
president was not informed beforehand but that she was
mistructed so much. It is sad indeed that a nation doubts the
sincerity of the head of state in promoting peace and are
compelled to seek subterfuges to prevent such person from
destroying peace prospects.
Wickremesinghe therefore is not to be faulted in being
reluctant to brief Kumaratunga of each phase of the process
until the very last. The omission was not deliberate but there
was certainly no excess of enthusiasm to do so either.
Kumaratunga's response to this particularly the admonishing
proffered give rise to much amusement because of the
analogies invoked by her.
Cease 'firing'
Kumaratunga writes of the agreement format and procedures
involved. She refers glowingly to the agreement she signed
with Prabakharan on January 8, 1995. What is lost sight of
here is that in 1995 there was no third party. Therefore, both
sides signed and initialled the same document. Moreover, the
signing was separate with Kumaratunga doing it in Colombo
and Prabakharan in Jaffna.
In 1987, the accord was signed not between the disputants. It
was India that signed on behalf of the Tamils with of course
the exception of the LTTE. In the present situation Norway
was the mutually accepted and accredited facilitator. Thus
both sides preferred to sign the ceasefire separately and as
separate documents. The identical letters providing an
undertaking to the Norwegian prime minister are also
separate. All documents are now deposited with Oslo apart
from copies. Another factor in this regard that the LTTE's
chief negotiator Anton Balasingham was not in Sri Lanka or
Norway but in London. All this necessitated extra reliance on
modern technology and extraordinary procedures being
adopted. So Kumaratunga's caustic comments about
procedure are not valid except perhaps as a debatable point.
Kumaratunga also laments that had Wickremesinghe
consulted her earlier both of them could have indulged in a
discussion and arrived at a bipartisan consensus which she
says is essential for any final settlement. There is no doubt
that an agreement between both major parties is crucial for
any settlement arrived at to become law. But in this case the
agreement is not a final political settlement but only an
arrangement to cease 'firing.' What has been left unsaid by
Kumaratunga is that it was she who failed to honour the
bipartisan accord reached years ago through the efforts of
former British Deputy Foreign Minister Liam Fox. So much for
bipartisan cooperation.
In the present instance there was absolutely no possibility of
her agreeing unitedly with Wickremesinghe to the ceasefire
agreement as it is now. Any constructive dialogue with her on
this would have resulted in her insisting on clauses that would
have prevented fruitful results. It would have been a repetition
of the previous exercise where the calculated inflexibility of the
Kumaratunga-Kadirgamar duo deadlocked and then
destroyed the peace process.
Another constraint for Wickremesinghe was that the Tigers
were extremely hostile to Kumaratunga and Kadirgamar.
Involving them too much would have been counterproductive.
Wickremesinghe therefore understandably adopted a
pragmatic approach and was flexible on a number of matters.
It was that which helped bring about a ceasefire. Any
premature discussion would have only helped abort the
project. Kumaratunga may not realise it but there are very few
takers of her assertion that she is for a peaceful settlement
now.
Too risky
Interestingly, it became common knowledge to the peace
process participants that Kumaratunga was not going to be a
signatory to the proposed ceasefire agreement. She would
have restricted her options and limited her destructive
capacity had she done so. If Kumaratunga had signed the
ceasefire agreement she was obligated to help implement it.
She would have been precluded from casting aspersions on it
as she is doing now.
The government, LTTE and Oslo are not politically naive to
have not realised the advantages they had in getting
Kumaratunga to endorse the ceasefire. But they were also
astute about two things. One was that the gamble of involving
her in the process with the expectation that she would
endorse it was too risky. Secondly, and more clinchingly they
seemed absolutely sure that Kumaratunga would not sign it
because she wanted to play negative politics. Hence, the
nomenclatural transformation of the document from the
original Memorandum of Understanding to plain ceasefire
agreement and also clause 4 (1) stipulating who the
representative signatories were to be.
Apart from complaints about procedural defects Kumaratunga
takes umbrage over a number of substantive clauses too. At
the same time she takes pride in the fact that some provisions
are replicated from peace process exercises carried on by her
in the past. Kumaratunga seeks to exorcise various spectres
by projecting some clauses as being detrimental to the
sovereignty and security of the country. Suspicions are
evoked about the sinister designs of Norway which as she
herself proclaims was invited first by her. A clumsy attempt is
also made to involve India by drawing parallels with
non-existent examples.
