TamilWeek, Dec 4 - 10, 2005
Elections: Ranil Wickremesinghe, Mahinda Rajapakse
and Siritunga Jayasuriya

By Professor Karthigesu Sivathamby

Sri Lanka has had elections changing governments before. But there has seldom
been such political dislocation emerging through the exercise of the franchise as
is happening after the recent polls. Every major political organisation of the south
is grappling with internal problems and none of the groups in coalition are working
in unison after 17 November.

The country now faces a completely new set of challenges and the three
contestants mentioned in the headline symbolise the change that is occurring in
Sri Lanka.

Ranil Wickremesinghe has earned much sympathy after the election results, and
the urban middle-class, both Sinhala and Tamil, feel that he has been unfairly
treated. His electoral defeat highlights certain aspects, which though
contradictory, constitute a dilemma posed by the polls.

The first relates to the votes he polled in the Sinhala areas. After the results there
seems to be a growing tendency among the state media to give an impression that
the vote for Mahinda Rajapakse was large and phenomenal, implying thereby
Rajapakse was able to win the hearts of the Sinhala peasantry. The second
relates to the morality of the northeastern Tamils – especially the north – in not
having voted for a man who brought in ‘peace.’ Understandably the LTTE has
become the focus of attention over the second issue.

To have a look at the second matter first: it is true that even some of the most
liberal minded, traditionally anti-UNP Sinhalese wanted Wickremesinghe to win
because they did not wish to see the JVP triumph. They feel very strongly that the
Tamils of the north, if not the LTTE, have not done the morally correct thing in
rejecting the UNP candidate.

One could understand how political problems are seen from this perspective –
especially in the context in which issues are addressed within the Sinhala
electorate. But they seem not to take into account how Wickremesinghe and his
close associates were responsible for creating fear and doubt in the minds of the
Tamil voter and about the sincerity of opposition leader’s commitment towards a
just peace.

Even if we were to disregard Naveen Dissanayake’s claims that Wickremesinghe
had very ingeniously prompted the Karuna breakaway, one cannot dismiss out of
hand the statements credited to Milinda Moragoda who is very close to
Wickremesinghe. Though internal dissention within the UNP about its future
leadership – after all Naveen is Gamini Dissanayake’s son – could have been the
cause of the young Nuwara Eliya MP’s outburst, Moragoda is different.

Reportedly Moragoda had stated that Wickremesinghe was no betrayer of the
Sinhalese because it was he who promoted the Karuna coup. The deeper waters
of the UNP’s internal politics are too difficult to fathom, but a statement like this
coming from a man who is the trusted emissary and lieutenant of Wickremesinghe
shocked the Tamils. The LTTE’s consternation, seen from that standpoint, is
understandable.

Second, there was also the larger issue of the international safety net operating in
the Palk Strait and south of it. Evidently, this safety net, which would enable US
surveillance over Sri Lanka’s waters, was construed as a major threat to the Sea
Tigers. Of course, there was no discussion about this in the Sinhala media but
there were ample references to it in the Tamil.

Thirdly, there was local eastern politics. Without any reference to the Tamils of
Amparai, Wickremesinghe virtually promised that a separate administration would
be set up for the southeast. At a time when the SLMC itself has declared the
merger has to be discussed from a northeastern perspective, Wickremesinghe
made a statement that virtually played into the hands of elements like A. L. M.
Athaulla whose political stance demands a separation of the east from the north.

Though the second and third factors did not have an obvious impact on the
regular Tamil voter, they raised questions about the sincerity of Wickremesinghe’s
commitment. There is a Tamil proverb, which states that vigorous enmity is better
than a slippery friendship.

To be fair by Wickremesinghe, he might not have plotted all these, but it is one’s
duty to refer to the inner fears and suspicions of the Tamil voters. Had the Sinhala
media been as bold and open, the Sinhala readers and viewers would have known
this much earlier.

The sum total of the whole situation is that the Jayewardene-Wijewardene family
nexus within the UNP has come under very serious threat. It is ironic that Ranil, the
son of Esmond Wickremesinghe who was renowned as a wily strategist, should
face such a humiliating situation. It is also true the UNP is in want of more earthy,
Premadasa-like leadership.

Rajapakse, the victor of the allied Sinhala forces, finds his problems have only
begun after the victory. Abandoning the ‘hand’ symbol for the ‘betel,’ he now finds
himself in a different environment from what he knew in the past.

Leaving aside the campaign trail and reviewing only post-election movements, one
notices that on the day the results were officially announced, Rajapakse’s
responses were very cautious and not provocative at all. But his address at the
swearing in ceremony was very different. The first part of the speech referred to
the popular support he had received for his mandate. But the balance, punctuated
by the cheering of the audience, seemed more aggressive and the basic
principles of deconstruction would reveal that they were aimed at the departing
president and her; policies.

The formation of the cabinet however brought out a completely different picture.
The ‘betel’ was significant by its absence and the ‘hand’ appeared to have
reasserted itself. The definitiveness with which the oncoming government was
described (“this is a new government and a new vision”) sounded very confident.

One can understand the president’s eagerness to express his gratitude to the
younger members of the SLFP who had stood shoulder to shoulder with him
during his election campaign. But the realities of power politics have demanded
that hierarchy of the last cabinet is not completely disturbed – the allocation of
portfolios is by and large according to seniority in the party.

The announcement regarding the ministerial appointments reveals the centripetal
forces that are at work within the government. The JVP has not accepted any
portfolios. Nor has the JHU.

The post-election speeches of the new president also indicate the need for
watchfulness with regard to peace, and more important, on the question of certain
anti-American sentiments expressed during the election campaign. The SLMM has
in its statement sounds more clear than what the mainstream media said during
the last week. The SLMM stated very concisely that the president had accepted
the ceasefire fully. This implies that Rajapakse now accepts the MOU as it stands
but would like to discuss the changes needed. There is a slight difference of
emphasis here. During the election campaign the stress was on amending the
MOU and then going for peace talks.

During the campaign several adjustments had to be made in reference with whom
talks for a settlement of the ethnic conflict should be conducted. More significantly,
the outright dismissal of the role of Norway is not so clearly expressed now.
Uneasy lies the head that wears the crown!

At this point, it is important to also examine the question whether Wickremesinghe
did not have significant support in the Sinhala-Buddhist constituency. The figures
show he has not gone below 35% mark in any of the electoral districts. And given
the type of voter behaviour in the northeast, it would be foolish to interpret the
48% of the entire national vote he polled as a product of Thondaman and Hakeem’
s blessings.

It may be that the state media in wanting to be on the good books of the new
president do not refer to this, but the advisors to the president and the president
himself should be advised to interpret the poll figures realistically.

As the campaign became hotter and hotter, the two leading candidates directly
and indirectly expressed concern for the Sinhala vote. The references to the non-
Sinhala communities were in terms of a heavily loaded word ‘sulu jaththi.’ The
semantics of the word ‘sulu’ creates a feeling of discrimination in the minds of the
non-Sinhala groups.

It is at this point the speech made by Siritunga Jayasuriya (United Socialist
Alliance), who we understand polled only 35,425 votes, has tremendous impact.
Watching him on TV making that pithy post-election address in the presence of
fellow-presidential candidates, a Tamil academic told me that never had he felt so
elated to call himself a Sri Lankan as at that moment when Jayasuriya exhorted
the newly-elected president that his biggest task would be to build bridges not only
with the Tamils, but also the Muslims (he used the word Tamil-speaking people) if
this country were to remain a single unit.

It was a completely unexpected voice, which at the end of a campaign and election
where references were made by nearly all candidates to race, that declared with
all sincerity and force to regard the Tamils and Muslims as part of this country. It is
my humble belief that Sri Lanka for its future depends on people like Siritunga
Jayasuriya. It is they who make the country one.

[Courtesy: NorthEastern Monthly]
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