"LTTE is not the sole rep of Tamils.
They are insecure" - Dr.Saravanamuttu
The Lanka Academic - Bandula Jayasekara in Colombo,
24 August 2005.
Dr Pakiasothy Saravanamuttu, founder / Director of the Center for Policy
Alternatives (CPA) says the LTTE is not the sole representative of the Tamils in Sri
Lanka and they have been more insecure than secure. In a HARDLINE interview
on YATV/TNL TV , Saravanamuttu said that Mr. Lakshman Kadirgamar was on the
LTTE hit list since he became Foreign Minister and the LTTE wanted to deal a
blow at the peace process because they had problems with regard to control.
"Control is a key factor for the LTTE and they had problems in terms of three
years of Cease Fire and people have started investing in a no war, no peace
situation kind of thing. Let's look at the LTTE since 2002, since the Cease Fire was
signed. I think the LTTE have been more insecure than secure, they've had more
challenge in that three year period than before."
On the timing of Mr. Kadirgamar's assassination, before he was to attend the UN
General Assembly , Dr Saravanamuttu said " I think that's the interesting point with
regard to the assassination by the LTTE. I feel that the timing was probably
connected with an attempt to decisively affect the balance of forces in the South,
talk about impending Presidential and general elections etc. So I think the idea was
to have that impact on the balance of forces in the South. Probably buttress the
hard line stance of some of the political actors and really deal a blow to the peace
process.
He also said " I believe that the LTTE is responsible for the killings and I have to
accept that when I say that I'm saying not because I have hard evidence or
something like that but I'm looking at it on the basis of past record, the possible
motives etc. And I think the LTTE have to deal with a situation in which any political
assassination in the country is easily attributed to them because of their past
behavior. There is an element of guilt until proven innocent.
HARDLINE INTERVIEW – Dr. P. Saravanamuttu
Executive Director of CPA
Q- On Hardline today is Dr. Pakiasothy Saravanamuttu the founder and the
Director of the Center for Policy alternatives better known as the CPA. Welcome to
Hardline Dr. Saravanamuttu. The Government has accused the LTTE of killing Mr.
Lakshman Kadirgama and the LTTE has denied it how do you think it will affect the
peace process?
A- Well as you the peace process at the point of the assassination was badly in
need of reviving. We had a no war, no peace situation or more likely a low intensity
conflict given the number of killings and violations that were happening. The
assassination and the belief in the culpability of the LTTE with regard to it is going
to make it politically very difficult for a Government to try to sit down around a table
and talk to the LTTE. I think the big issue here is how they can continue to
interact to manage the Cease Fire.
Q- Now Dr. Jayantha Danapala Secretary General of the Peace Secretariat has
said it was a great set back and that it should be reviewed, so how do you think the
Government should act at this point in time?
A-Well I think the primary concern at the present moment is going to be with regard
to strengthening the Cease Fire. The Cease Fire has come to be perceived by
some as being quite farcical because of the levels of violations that we’ve had. The
President has talked about a review rather that a renegotiation. I think that is
absolutely right. The arguments for the Cease Fire when it was signed in 2002 was
some notion of a reality check, that the ground reality was set that this is the kind
of reality that one could make. I think you need to have another reality check.
Because you have a Cease Fire agreement both sides say; “we have observed
the Cease Fire want to retain the status quo.” But with in that you have all these
human rights violations that are going on, child conscription, that kind of thing.
Q- Don’t you think that this was the biggest blow to the Cease Fire agreement?
A-Well it may well have been. In that it is the most high profile killing in terms of the
peace process and the actor’s involved in it. But the think the Cease Fire was very
definitely under threat and challenged before that.
Q- Mr Kadirgama was to attend the UN General Assembly and he was to be there
for 2 weeks. How do you see the timing of the killing?
A- I think that’s the interesting point with regard to the assassination by the LTTE. I
feel that the timing was probably connected with an attempt to decisively affect the
balance of forces in the South, talk about impending Presidential and Law general
elections etc. So I think the idea was to have that impact on the balance of forces
in the South. Probably buttress the hard line stance of some of the political actors
and really deal a blow to the peace process.
Q- Do you think the LTTE is behind the killing?
A- I believe that the LTTE is responsible for the killings and I have to accept that
when I say that I’m saying not because I have hard evidence or something like that
but I’m looking at it on the basis of past record, the possible motives etc. And I
think the LTTE have to deal with a situation in which any political assassination in
the country is easily attributed to them because of their past behavior. There is an
element of guilty until proven innocent.
Q- President Kumaratunge went out of her way, she lost her coalition partner the
JVP , she signed the PTOMS to support the North East and in spite of all that the
LTTE killed Mr. Kadirgama. Why do you think they did that because it goes against
them completely?
A-My argument in terms of why the LTTE would kill Mr. Kadirgama; as we know Mr.
Kadirgama was on the hit list since he became Foreign Minister practically. Why
they killed him I think is because as I said earlier they wanted to decisively affect
the political balance of power in the South. They wanted to deal a blow at the
peace process because I think they had problems with regard to control. Control is
a key factor for the LTTE and they had problems in terms of three years of Cease
Fire and people have started investing in a no war, no peace situation kind of
thing. Problems with regard to I think control of a cadre as well. Let’s look at the
LTTE since 2002, since the Cease Fire was signed. I think the LTTE have been
more insecure than secure, they’ve had more challenge in that three year period
than before.
Q- What should be the role of the International Community now? Do you think they
have sufficient influence over the LTTE as well as the Government?
A- Well I think they have influence over the Government because Governments
have influence over other Governments. The big question is to what extent and to
what degree do they have influence over the LTTE. I’m not 100% sure that they
have a great deal of influence over the LTTE. But certainly the point has come, in
the context of a peace a sustainable peace process every one has to begin to
start dealing with the LTTE some what differently to what they have in the past. I
think Mr. Jayantha Dhanapala made this point about reviewing also the way the
processes and the procedures of dealing with the LTTE or what ever the phrase
was. I think the International Community have to be able to impress upon the LTTE
that partnership in a peace process assumes certain types of behavior and certain
other types of behavior are unacceptable with in that. That message has to go out
loud and clear. Also I think its important that when the International Community
engages with the LTTE that it is assured that it is engaging with key decision
makers or key advisors to “the decision maker’ within the LTTE. So that the
interaction is not with a spokesperson how ever high profile that person might be.
Q- Dr. Saravanamuttu you stated the need for the International Community to deal
with one proper decision maker as far as the LLTE is concerned. But it seems that
the sole decision maker is the Leader of the LTTE though there are spokesmen.
So can dealing with a spokes person be avoided?
A- I don’t know. I don’t have a sort of ground plan. But what I’m trying to say here is
that it is important when one feels that you have an interaction with the LTTE that
you are not having an interaction with someone who is only just stating what the
organizations position, etc is. That you can engage with those people who are
advising. If it is Prabakaran who makes all the decisions of the LTTE maybe he has
a close set of advisors who one can talk to. One must try to be able to penetrate
that. Because otherwise you are dealing with on one side being able to talk to
Presidents, Foreign Ministers, Peace Secretariats and all of that while on the other
side are you really being able to convey messages get your important point across
to the real decision makers becomes a question.
Q- Now I recall the late Mr. Kadirgama saying at a press conference when he was
questioned whether the government would opt for war. He said be it the UNP or
SLFP they would not opt for war and that war or no war is in the mind of one
person, that is Vellupulai Prabakaran. So don’t you think in that context the LTTE
leader should meet more people?
A- Yes most certainly. This idea that he only comes out on set occasions etc, I
think they need to look at that again. If you are going to get involved in a peace
process which leads to a democratic peace as it were then the people involved
have to come out and engage.
Q- Don’t you think the Norwegians have failed in that context? And what do you
think they should do?
A- I think certainly the time has come for the Norwegians too to review how they
have dealt with both the Government and the LTTE and the peace process as a
whole. I mean its been three years since the signing of the Cease Fire a lot has
happened since. There are dynamics that have been released as a consequence
of the signing of that agreement that need to be taken into account and inform the
interaction in the future. So I think they need to look at new at what kind of
approach that they should have as the President herself has talked about- a
review.
Q- But aren’t the Norwegians themselves helpless at this point?
A- Well helpless to the extent that you have got the LTTE denial and you have got
the Government saying we think that it is the LTTE. Now I understand that the
Norwegian Foreign Minister and Mr. Helgessen will be going to see Anton
Balsingham in London. So I think what they can turn around and say is that they
first and foremost need to ascertain as to what the real intentions of the parties are
with regard to the Cease Fire and the Peace Process. If it is the case that one
party or both parties feel that there is an irreversible slide towards war, etc then of
course they have no role. But if there is a definite interest and commitment on the
two parties to main the Cease Fire indeed, then indeed go ahead and strengthen
it. Then they need to talk. But talk in very realistic terms.
Q-How do you see the LTTE’s recent attack on the UN office in Killinochi?
A-That is just totally unacceptable. Their argument I would imagine, their logic is
this; Killinochi is territory that we control and that therefore we can dictate to the
International Community how it can behave in that territory. Now this is not the
behavior of an organization that hopes and aspires to be able to and says it can
run a separate state or a Regional Government or what ever.
Q- The International Community has been accused of being sympathetic toward
the LTTE by certain factions in the country so by this attack don’t you think the
LTTE would tend to lose that?
A- Yes certainly. Certainly the stock of the LTTE with regard to the International
Community at the present moment I would imagine is low
Q- How do you see the role of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission? I remember Mr.
Kadirgama saying there should be monitors from Asian Countries.
A- Well I think the first point with regard to them is this; What is their mandate? I
think the Cease Fire envisages them in only a naming and shaming role. Now if we
want to have them in some kind of punitive role then we have to beat them up and
yes, bring in others as well. But the question here is how many others are really
interested in sending monitors to Sri Lanka. I think there are times at which we
over estimate the interests of the International Community when it comes to actual
material and man power assistance, with regard to monitoring. But there is no
escaping from the fact that yes, the monitoring hasn’t been as effective as it ought
to be. It has been naming and shaming but if you have either side or one side with
a particularly thick skin naming and shaming is not going to work. It may in the
future if we sign things like the International Criminal Court. Then it might work into
the future where you have collected a huge amount of data with regard to
violations and all of that. But you need a larger group. You need a change in terms
of the mandate and mission. A lager group. You also need to recognize that that
larger group can’t operate entirely on its own. It has to be able to partner with the
locals because there is a lot about the ground situation that any foreigner coming
into this country won’t be able to understand or relate as would local organizations.
Q. Now the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission can operate in Government areas but
they can’t go to LTTE areas. There have been instances where they have been
assaulted. So in your views how could one beef them up?
A. Beef them up in the sense if you need more people then you need more people.
But as I said you first and foremost need to review the mandate. Because I think
the basic assumption with regard to the whole Ceasefire Agreement is the
assumption that the LTTE controls those areas that it does. The issue is with
regard to it engaging in political activity in the areas that are under government
controlled.
Q. How do you see the ordinary people living behind the LTTE’s iron curtains, how
do you see their plight?
A. Well I think as far as the people in the North and East are concerned both under
the LTTE as well as Government controlled areas, the first point I would want to
make is that their material circumstances in terms of being able to catch up and for
us to get a level playing field with the levels of development between the North
East and the rest of the country there is a tremendous amount to do. I think the
problem with regard to the challenge faced by the people in LTTE controlled areas
is very much the question of whether they enjoy their civil and political liberties in
the way that we do in areas of Government control. So the problem here is that
you need to be able to arrive at levels of development, restore normalization,
social and economic activity. You also need to recognize that with that much of go
a loosening up of control, pluralism, decent freedom of expression all of those
things. The two have to go hand in hand and I think one of the challenges that the
LTTE has faced is that you can’t really successfully sort of lop off economics from
politics. If you think that in the last three years if anyone thought that economics
was sort of going to create and restore, create a situation of normalization etc, it
has not corned political effects. And it will affect the extent to which a single
organization can control a population.
Q. Do you see the LTTE as the soul representatives of the Tamils?
A. Certainly not.
Q. How do you see the impact of the forth coming elections be it Presidential or
General in the peace process?
A. There are a couple of things. One of course is that no Anti-UNP coalition
whether it being a General or a Presidential from looking at the electoral arithmetic
concept as it were, could win without JVP support. And JVP support will obviously
come at a price in terms of the political program. So even if it not an explicit
embracing of a JVP platform who ever the candidate is in a Presidential election
or the party in terms of a Parliamentary election will have to be sort of leaning or
tilting towards that side. If you’re not going with them you want to try to steal their
clothes. Quite simply. Second point is that I think it’s very important that the two
sides whoever particularly with regard to a Presidential race, that what they have in
common they should state very clearly so that the “Janathava” knows what it is.
Then they can debate and discuss in terms of the election campaign where they
have a difference. Often the politicking between the UNP and the SLFP masks the
simple fact that they have a lot in common. Particularly with regard to the Peace
Process and when it comes to the economy. Those two parties have a lot more in
common with each other than either of them will ever have with the JVP. And that’s
a simple fact. I think for an informed, educated campaign we need to have that out
on the table.
Q. It is said that Mahinda Rajapakse and Ranil Wickramesinghe have a healthy
respect toward each other. Do you think the moment Chandrika moves out, that
these two parties, the main parties will be able to work together?
A. They may well be able to work together. The period in which Mr.
Wickramesinghe was the Prime Minister and Mr. Rajapakse was the leader of
opposition they did have a good working relationship. One looks forward to a
restoration of that.
Q. That’s what we need, more unity. They can work together.
A. Absolutely. You need constructive corporation between political parties where
you’re not sort of saying that we’re playing happy family and there are no
differences between us but we need to also set out very clearly as to what we have
in common.
Q. Where do you see the JHU coming here, the monks and the JHU factor?
A. Well the JHU taking that kind of hard line I don’t think it is going to be able to go
very far on its own. Its influence will come in terms of an alliance with some one. So
I think the JHU may well be their clothes and their colors as it were may well be
snatched by the JVP.
Q. You’re a leading member of the Sri Lankan civil society, why is that the Sri
Lankan civil society has failed to push or get the Peace Process moving so far?
A. Number of reasons. I think first and foremost is that the Sri Lankan civil society
that we’re talking about comes in all shapes and sizes but I think the case that in
this country, in Sri Lanka, civil society is very politicized in partisan terms.
Therefore is a perception that organizations are either when it comes to the
Peace Process for example they are pro-UNP Peace Process or they’re pro-PA
Peace process kind of thing so that is a major problem. Secondly I don’t think we
have in this country a tradition of this kind of civil society activism and
demonstration. I think interestingly enough since we’ve been having universal
franchise since ’31 and had political parties soon there after, I think that there is a
belief that change really comes through the ballot box. That other organizations
and civil descent and agitation doesn’t really lead to that at the end of the day.
Also I think there is another challenge that a lot of civil society organizations face
interested in the Peace Process and all of that, is that they need to be able to
reach out to community based organizations need to do a lot more work in Sinhala
and Tamil, need to go out and talk to people, explain to them how peace makes a
difference to their lives on a daily basis. I think for an example if we talk about
federalism or devolution there’s no point in talking to a person in Monaragala for
example about that in terms of how it would benefit people in Jaffna or Batticaloa.
You need to be able to explain it to them in terms of how it’s going to make a
difference in Monaragala.
Q. Talking about the civil society take for an example May Day in Sri Lanka has
become a party day. It is led by a political party. Then take for the example cost of
living, there’s always a party behind that. But in India or Bangladesh it’s the
people, the house wives who go out and say look the prices have gone up. Why
can’t people like you or me energize and give more leadership to the common
masses?
A. One can try. But I have a theory which I can’t give any academic evidence to
support but I think one of the principle reasons for this is unlike India or
Bangladesh or Pakistan we never fought for Independence. The society was never
galvanized together in any kind of civic agitation against people in positions of
authority and power. So hence you will get a lot of support for political power.
There’s a tremendous amount of support in terms interest in election, our
participation rates of elections will always consistently be high. There is this belief
that people have that things are really changed through the ballot box. This is very
good. But they have to recognize that democracy does involve constant vigilance
even when people are in office. This is a challenge; we have to keep beavering
away at it in order to get people interested in political activity even when there is a
Government in power.
Q. I hate to use the word “market” when it comes to peace but however, why is that
we have failed to market peace in this country? Who should take the blame is it the
civil society or the Government?
A. I think everyone should take the responsibility for it because everyone has a
responsibility for it. We had a situation if you remember under the first PA
Government where you had the “Samathavalama” and “ Sudhunelum” and all of
that but there was a certain amount if criticism with regard to that saying that this
was being used for partisan political purposes as oppose to anything else. So I
think what needs to be done is when a Government wants to be able to inform and
educate a public about a particular Peace Proposal or whatever that I tries to get
into a partnership with civil society organizations who may be able to help and
provide the network. As well as the opposition party. I don’t understand as to why
we can’t have a situation if the UNP and the SLFP agree on a particular aspect of
the Peace Process or say that we will not go back to war, why on earth why can’t
you have UNP politicians and PA politicians standing on the same platform and
saying that? What’s happened now in Sri Lanka is that the partisan politicization of
almost every aspect of life has gone so deep, has penetrated so far that one has
to now start trying o roll that back.
Q. Is that people here think in English, is it because that we’re not thinking in
Tamil, thinking in Sinhala is it because of that?
A. Partly as I said earlier on. In terms of the relative failure of civil society
organizations is to reach out in this respect. To be able to reach out and talk to
people provide material easily accessible material in Sinhala and Tamil. Absolutely
right. One needs to that.
Q. Dr. Saravanamuttu are respected as a good analyst. What should be the role of
the next Foreign Minister because Mr. Kadirgama has done a lot at that time when
he came in 1994 he had to change the image of Sri Lanka and he had to count
LTTE propaganda and so on?
A. I think the role of the next Foreign Minister in the context of the Peace Process
is a role which says that look, we want to be able to maintain a Ceasefire and we
want to able to move towards a political settlement. We want the International
Community on our side in terms of understanding that we will constructively
engage with the LTTE in order to achieve this. But constructive engagement does
not involve indulgence. We want the support of the International Community to be
able to get this message across to backstop it and buttress it. That we are going to
have to deal somewhat differently with the LTTE. I think there was an element of
trying to bend over backwards to a certain extent to make sure that the LTTE
stayed at the table. We’ve gone through that first phase. Now we need to get to
the point at which where it’s going to hard talk if you like. In terms of we need to
move towards a settlement in order to be able to move towards a settlement and
really test the partnership between us we have to behave in certain ways and we
want the International Community to backstop that.
Q. What is to be expected in the future considering many the human rights
violation etc?
A. Well I don’t what is to be expected. But I know what I would like to expect. I would
like to expect very much that the two sides even if they can’t start talking about
Federalism etc, that the Ceasefire remains and it’s managed in a sensible way.
Secondly that we get a proper Human Rights agreement where there binding
commitment on the parties to ensure that things like child conscriptions political
killings counter assassinations extortion all of those things are dealt in a
meaningful and affective way.
Dr. Saravanamuttu thank you for joining Hardline.
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