British Model of Devolution
By Nisala Rodrigo
Having noted the 8 February declaration at the National
Symposium at BMICH made by a thousand participants
representing twenty-five organizations calling for a federal
solution to solve Sri Lanka’s ethnic conflict, followed by
Pres. Mahinda Rajapakse’s defense of the unitary state and
rejection of Tamil Eelam in his interview with Reuters on 13
February, I followed the subsequent comments made by Mr.
Douglas Jayasekera and Mr. Devanesan Nesiah in The
Island (as I read on www.tamilweek.com, 26 Feb 2006) with
great interest. The two gentlemen presented their own
interpretations of “devolution within a unitary state” as
particularly found in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland, which Pres. Rajapakse had himself offered
as an alternative model to federalism. I hope to add my own
observations on the nature of devolution in the UK and point
out some neglected issues which may be very relevant to
the context of the Sri Lankan ethnic conflict.
Devolved Subjects
Mr. Nesiah’s response to Mr. Jayasekera largely consisted
of a description of subjects devolved to the Scottish
Parliament. There are basically two lists of subjects in
relation to Scotland: the powers reserved for the British
Parliament in Westminster and the “nonreserved” powers
which the Scottish Parliament can assume. The latter list
includes health, education, housing, economic development,
criminal justice and prosecution, police and prisons,
agriculture, fisheries and forestries, and sports and arts as
Mr. Nesiah pointed out. The reserved list consists of
international affairs, defense, national security,
antiterrorism, fiscal policy, currency, immigration, extradition,
enforcing drug and firearms law, regulating businesses and
financial institutions, industrial relations, postal and
telegraph services, energy matters, transportation, and
equal opportunity.
Then there is the Assembly of Northern Ireland which has
three lists. Its “nonreserved” list covers most of the subjects
found in its Scottish counterpart, notably excluding police
and criminal justice and prosecution. The “reserved” powers
may be devolved with a concurrent majority among the
Nationalists and Unionists in the Assembly, and they include
navigation, aviation, natural resources, postal services,
requirements for Assembly membership, criminal law,
extradition to Ireland, public order, police, enforcing drug,
firearms, and explosives law, civil defense, regulating
businesses and financial institutions. The “excepted” powers
are similar to the Scottish “reserved” list, excluding
commercial regulation and the enforcement of drug and
firearms law. These powers are irrelevant, however, given
that this Assembly has been suspended by the British
Parliament.
It is clear that the lists in N. Ireland reflect a greater concern
with security than those of Scotland. Regardless of the level
of devolution, though, these two legislatures are clearly
subordinate to the British Parliament whose sole
“sovereignty” has led political scientists to label the UK as a
unitary state. However, I leave it to others to compare these
lists with those found in the 13th Amendment and to
determine whether or not those found in our Constitution
compare favorably with the Scottish and Northern Irish
subjects (I have omitted discussing self-government in
Wales, as I consider it as insufficiently adequate for a Sri
Lanka discussion). I am more interested in exploring the
historical context of devolution in the UK and drawing a few
among many lessons for us to contemplate.
Historical Background
My understanding of devolution in the UK largely comes
from Prof. Michael Keating’s contribution to Federalism and
Territorial Cleavages, a volume edited by Nancy Bermeo
and Ugo Amoretti (available on Amazon.com for US$47.67).
One of Prof. Keating’s more noteworthy initial observations
is that although the international political science community
generally labels the UK as a “unitary state,” the British for
their part have historically identified their country as a
“union state” which could neither be classified as federal or
unitary. Ireland was conquered in stages from the 12th
century onwards, and its history within the UK has largely
had a colonial context. Scotland merged with England in
1603, and in 1707 the parliaments of both nations were
dissolved in favor of a British Parliament. Thus was born the
United Kingdom and its new flag, the “Union Jack” combined
the banners of St. George (England), St. Andrew (Scotland),
and St. Patrick (Ireland) in 1801.
The last years of the 19th century saw the rise of Irish
nationalism and the Gladstone government’s proposal for
“Home Rule.” The Liberals argued that the establishment of
an Irish parliament subordinate to Westminster would
contain Irish nationalism and preserve the British union.
Interestingly, the opponents of devolution also were
motivated by the conviction that Britain was a multinational
state, but they retorted that subordinate parliaments would
embody separate national sovereignties and encourage
separatism. The antidevolutionists did not advocate a British
national identity to which the English, Welsh, Scottish, and
Irish had to assimilate; they affirmed that a unitary system
would best ensure the plural nature of British society. Irish
home rule was eventually established in 1910, although the
violence ensuing from Conservative-backed Unionist militias
and the rise of Sinn Fein to power in 1918 led to Irish
partition and the creation of two home rule governments in
Ireland- one which eventually became the separate Republic
of Ireland, and the other the Province of Northern Ireland
with its parliament in Stormont. The illiberal tactics of the
Protestant-majority Stormont regime with regard to the
Catholic minority led to the dissolution of the N. Irish
Parliament in 1972 and the imposition of direct rule from
Westminster through a secretary of state who was not
locally elected. The passage of the Northern Ireland Act of
1998 offered a possible end to direct rule, but the British
government suspended the Assembly of Northern Ireland
due to the inability of the Unionists and Nationalists to work
together.
The Scots had a very different story of devolution. After the
dissolution of their original parliament, the Scots were
administered by a secretary of state who was a British MP
with Cabinet status. The Scots’ overrepresentation in the
British Parliament actually dissuaded them from pursuing
home rule. Gradually, however, a sense of Scottish
nationalism evolved not from perceptions of relative
deprivation but relative prosperity, as the Scots did not need
to lobby Westminster for economic relief when their
economy boomed. The first step in Scottish home rule was
administrative devolution through the Scottish Development
Agency established in the 1970s. The Scotland Act of 1998
finally established the Scottish Parliament headed by a first
minister, although it was preceded by a great deal of familiar
rhetoric that devolution would be a “slippery slope” to
separation. Its source of funding is almost entirely a block
grant from Westminster, although the Scots have the ability
to raise or lower their income tax by as much as 3% and
have control over property tax.
The Multinational Union and Sri Lanka
My own misgivings with the British model have nothing to do
with its level of devolution nor even with its principle of
“parliamentary sovereignty” which is shared by the current
1978 Constitution of Sri Lanka. I believe that these areas
can be negotiated and resolved in an amicable manner,
assuming that the parties to such an agreement are
committed to a unified and democratic Sri Lanka. I do not
readily accept the British model of devolution because it is
based on a commonly-held notion of multinationalism which
is non-existent in Sri Lanka.
I earlier mentioned that even the most strident adversaries
of devolution in Britain acknowledged their country as a
multinational state. Essentially this meant that each “nation”
in the “union” had clearly-defined and undisputed borders
which have been established by a common notion of history.
No matter how anti-Scot he may be, an Englishman would
acknowledge the existence of Scotland as a geographic
entity; he would never claim that Glasgow or Edinburgh are
part of the “English Nation” which has existed from time
immemorial. Nor for that matter would a Scot claim York as
part of his homeland. These commonly-accepted national
borders marked the regional units of devolution in Britain
and would not in themselves generate controversy.
This situation does not exist in Sri Lanka where there are no
commonly-accepted interpretations of the “Sinhalese” and
“Tamil” nations. Historically the island has seen various
kingdoms come and go over the millennia. Even the borders
of the last surviving kingdoms before the colonial era would
never be accepted by either the Sinhalese or the Tamils.
The Jaffna kingdom comprised the peninsula together with
Mullaitivu, Mannar, and the northern Vanni, yet no Tamil
nationalist in Sri Lanka would accept such a “diminished”
territory as the sum of the Tamil homeland. The Kandyan
kingdom incorporated different territory depending on how
well it was resisting the European invaders; when Robert
Knox landed in Kottiyar in Trincomalee District after a
shipwreck in 1659, he was arrested on the orders of King
Rajasinghe II and taken into captivity in Kandy. A specific
debate in connection with this is the North-East
merger/demerger. I see the intractability of this zero-sum
debate as a factor which can defeat any attempt at a
negotiated solution based on devolution, that a merger or
demerger would be perceived as a defeat for one or the
other community and thus a powder keg for future conflict.
To support my argument I would present the example of N.
Ireland where the Nationalists claim the territory for Ireland
and the Unionists claim it for the UK; the Nationalists use
history to support their claims whereas the Unionists rely on
demographics and their numerical majority in the province;
thus the competing claims for homelands has fueled the
Irish conflict. One might be intrigued to learn that the
Unionists historically opposed home rule in N. Ireland,
believing that devolution would de-link the province from
Britain. Thus it is not surprising that the Stormont regime
actively sought to marginalize the Catholic minority and
restrict their representation in the N. Irish Parliament until its
dissolution in 1972. Therefore I submit that if irresolvable
differences in the perceptions of national territories and
homelands as well as the capacity to manipulate democratic
institutions can undermine peaceful devolution in an
advanced state such as the UK, there is little reason to
believe why a failure to resolve such issues would not
undermine devolution and a permanent settlement in Sri
Lanka. Other Lessons
On this note, I would like to share one interesting method
which the Unionist Protestants used to suppress the
Catholics. The original Government of Northern Ireland Act
(1920) stated that the electoral system of the N. Irish
Parliament would be based on the Single Transferable Vote
(STV) on the correct assumption that a relative measure of
proportional representation would allow the maximum level
of representation for the Catholic minority under a
democratic setup. STV had been used previously in local
government elections in Ireland through the Local
Government Act (1898). However, the 1920 Act allowed the
N. Irish Parliament to alter the electoral system three years
after its first meeting. In 1929, the Unionists circumvented
this obstacle to their absolute rule simply by changing the
electoral system to a majoritarian “first past the post” system
which effectively shut the Catholics from representation in
home rule.
I mention this injustice to remind my friends who clamor for
devolution in Sri Lanka that there are wider issues out there
than mere lists of devolved powers or the right for one’s
“nation” to have its own sports teams. The neglect of
something as seemingly mundane as the electoral system of
the regional government can have serious consequences
for minority rights. Although I believe that discussion and
debate on these lists is important (and more useful than
simply hanging on to the label of “federalism”), the
exchange of ideas needs to be more comprehensive.
Another lesson which is worth mentioning is how the Scottish
demand for home rule was effectively dampened by their
significant representation in the British Parliament. My
friends who fear devolution as the “first step” towards
separation should understand that historically, the Tamils
had been divided between those who believed their
interests were better served through regional self-
government, and those who advocated more representation
in the central authority (both in Parliament and the civil
service). In the 1920s the former was largely nonexistent,
and the latter viewpoint was well-articulated by the
Ponnambalams who rejected federalism as advocated by
SWRD Bandaranaike and the Kandyan nationalists. Here I
would not advocate the British model of representation
which was a jumbled mess of inequality before the 19th
century reforms, and I would present two alternatives to GG
Ponnambalam’s famous “50-50” offer which would be far
more democratic and conducive towards better ethnic
relations in Sri Lanka.
The first suggestion would be the creation of a second
chamber in Parliament which would provide greater
representation to the minorities than the original chamber
(which embodies the democratic “one man one vote” ideal).
The UK does not have such a second chamber and thus the
examples of other countries must be considered. We would
find that some countries such as Brazil and Australia have
very powerful second chambers and others such as
Germany or India have second chambers which are not as
strong, and thus there would be a lot of room for discussion
on which model would be best suited for Sri Lanka.
The second suggestion is for greater minority
representation in the Cabinet. Although the UK never
adopted a formal law to promote such power-sharing, the
non-English minorities have historically been well-
represented in the national Cabinet. Switzerland also has an
informal method of significantly including the French and
Italian minorities in its Cabinet. Belgium on the other hand is
constitutionally mandated to have equal representation in its
Cabinet between the French and Dutch speakers.
Therefore either formal or informal methods could be
employed for greater integration in the national government,
although I personally believe that relying on informal means
for minority representation in the Cabinet would
demonstrate a more sincere goodwill on the part of the
leadership from the majority community towards the
minorities.
I advocate that solutions based on these suggestions be
implemented alongside meaningful devolution as well as the
strengthening of the judiciary and law enforcement to
impartially protect human rights, so that the minority
communities will have incentives to disavow the “slippery
slope to separation” and to support and defend the unity
and integrity of Sri Lanka.
Reference
Michael Keating. “The United Kingdom – Political Institutions
and Territorial Cleavages.” Federalism and Territorial
Cleavages. Ed. Nancy Bermeo & Ugo Amoretti. The Johns
Hopkins University Press. 2004
Courtesy: LacNet
